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ABSTRACT
This dissertation aims to study the relationship between the transitioning 
formal and informal institutions and firm strategy during institutional transition. The 
central premise is that during the period when pre-existing institutions have not been 
fully abolished and new institutions take time to come into place, both pre-existing 
and emerging institutions exert different influences on the economic growth of a 
country via their effects on firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity. To empirically 
examine this theoretical premise, this dissertation examines how government 
influence (as a formal institution) and the control mechanisms of business groups (as 
an informal institution) simultaneously influence the wealth-creating corporate 
entrepreneurial strategy of member firms in a business group in a transition economy.
With archival and perceptual survey data from 992 member firms of the 
largest 250 business groups in the transition economy of China, it is found that formal 
institutions in various forms of government influence exert different impacts on 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Institutional legacy effects in the form of 
government’s administrative and ownership heritage have a hindering effect, while 
reform policy has an enhancing effect, on firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity. 
As for informal institutions, cultural, strategic, and financial controls are positively 
related to corporate entrepreneurial intensity o f group member firms. This confirms 
the importance of business groups as an informal void-filling institution in the 
transition economies. These findings enriched our understanding on the relationship 
between institutions and strategy during institutional transition, governance in 
business group, and wealth-creating entrepreneurial growth in transition economies.
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
Transition economies refer to those emerging economies that are changing 
from one with centralized (primarily communist) state control to one governed by 
market-oriented policies. One of the major characteristics of transition economies is 
a rapid pace of economic development, which is fostered by government policies 
favoring economic liberalization and the adoption of a free-market system (Arnold & 
Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Although undergoing rapid 
economic growth, transition economies are still in the progress of building 
institutional infrastructures that support well-functioning markets for capital, 
management and labor, and production and technology. Accordingly, compared to 
developed economies, transition economies are underdeveloped in terms of soft 
infrastructures (legal system, property rights, financial intermediaries, education, etc.) 
as well as hard infrastructures (e.g., transportation and telecommunication). So, 
during the institutional transition, that is, the period when pre-existing institutions 
have not been fully abolished and new effective market institutions have not been 
taken into place, an institutional void is resulted (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000a, 
2000b; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000).
How is such an institutional void being filled to foster rapid economic growth 
during the institutional transition? Qian (2000) proposed that government is the 
second-best response to the institutional failures faced by transition economies. Sachs 
(1996) also empirically found that the reform progress accounted twenty-five percent 
of the differences in average economic growth rates among the transition economies
in Eastern European and the former Soviet Union. This suggests that an important 
void-filling institution to foster economic growth in transition economies is the more 
formal nature of institutions, the government.
In addition to the formal role o f government in filling the institutional void, 
researchers started to realize that diversified business groups emerged as a growth 
engine in most emerging and transition economies to fill the institutional voids 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000b). Diversified business group is defined as a 
collection of legally independent firms that are bound by economic and social ties. 
They are commonly known as keiretsii in Japan, the chaebol in Korea, the grupos 
economicos in Latin America, the twenty-two families o f Pakistan, the qiye jituan in 
China, the quanxi qiye in Taiwan, and so on. Diversified business groups are 
conceptualized as responses to imperfections in the capital, labor, and product 
markets (Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 
2000b; Leff, 1978, 1979; Weistein & Yafeh, 1998). Compared to government, 
diversified business group is a more informal nature of institutions that emerge to 
facilitate economic growth during institutional transition.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how formal and informal 
institutions influence the economic growth of transition economies during the period 
of institutional transition. The central premise is that government and diversified 
business groups are the most effective formal and informal institutions respectively to 
fill the institutional void in transition economies. As for formal institutions, 
government substitutes for institutional failures in transition economies. During 
institutional transition, government has two contradictory roles. On the one hand.
government can be regarded as a long-lasting formal institution from the pre­
transition period. Government will exert an institutional legacy effect on economic 
growth via their administrative heritage and ownership effects in firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, government is carrying out economic 
reforms to transform the formal institutions in transition economies. Accordingly, 
from this perspective, government will exert a positive effect on economic growth via 
the gradual implementation of reform policy to facilitate a firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial activities. As for informal institutions, diversified business group can 
be regarded as an informal institution emerged to substitute for institutional failures in 
transition economies as well. Through their control mechanisms upon member firms, 
diversified business groups will positively facilitate member firm’s entrepreneurial 
growth activities. To summarize, this dissertation examines how government and 
diversified business groups simultaneously influence the corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity o f member firms of a diversified business group in a transitional economy.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation aims to build a theory and provide evidence on the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions and firm’s strategy during 
institutional transition. Empirically, the dissertation examines how government and 
business groups influence the economic growth o f a transition economy via their 
effects on firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity in a context of diversified 
business groups in China. Specific research questions and contributions of this 
dissertation are delineated below.
Research Question One: The first research question is a fundamental question 
in the fields of organization theory and strategic management: What is the 
relationship between institutions and strategy during institutional transition? The 
period of institutional transition indicates that formal institutions are transiting and 
informal institutions are emerging. How will formal and informal institutions fill the 
institutional voids during such a period of institutional transition? How will formal 
and informal institutions facilitate economic growth of transition economies 
respectively and simultaneously? Will there be any conflicts between the old and 
new institutions and what will be the impact of such institutional conflicts on firm’s 
strategy?
By addressing the question of the relationship between institutions and 
strategy mentioned above, this dissertation aims to overcome the overly simplistic 
view of institutional effects in the current literature, and thereby, enhancing the 
understanding of institutional effects in a period of transition. More specifically, this 
study attempts to enrich the understanding of the relationships between institutions 
and organizations in two ways. First, this study aims to highlight the heterogeneous 
effects of institutional change. Institutional theory, based either on the economics 
orientation or sociological orientation, has been used as a theoretical perspective in 
the arenas of strategic management and international business. And yet, current 
studies assume that the effects o f institutional change are homogeneous. However, 
during institutional transition, existing institutions will be transformed at different 
stages. Therefore, instead of assuming such institutional effects are homogeneous,
this study proposes and shows that institutional change exerts heterogeneous effects 
on firms’ strategic orientation.
Second, this study aims to highlight the simultaneous effects o f formal and 
informal institutions during the institutional transition. Past literature has focused on 
the relationship between either formal (e.g. economics and international business 
literature) or informal institutions (e.g. strategic management and sociology literature) 
and organizations but has not studied both types of institutions simultaneously. This 
study conceptualizes government and diversified business groups as formal and 
informal institutions that substitute for institutional failures in a transition economy. 
As such, the coexistence of formal and informal institutions is emphasized and both 
types of institutions are examined together to see how they influence firms’ corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity diuing institutional transition. In all, the first objective of 
this dissertation is to study the transitioning effects of institutions on firms, which 
thereby, can enrich our imderstanding on the relationship between institutions and 
organizations.
Research Question Two: The second research question examines how a 
diversified business group is managed. What are the different types o f control 
mechanisms in a business group? How does each of these control mechanisms help 
maximize the strategic benefits o f member firms as well as sustain the stability of the 
business group?
By addressing the above questions, this dissertation aims to go beyond 
describing how a diversified business group functions but to address the governance 
and control aspects o f such groups. Theoretically, there have been several
explanations for the emergence of diversified business groups. From an economics 
perspective, diversified business groups substitute for imperfect market institutions in 
the emerging economies. As such, business groups are conceptualized as responses 
to imperfections in the capital, labor, and product markets (Caves & Uekusa, 1976; 
Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000b; Leff, 1978, 1979; Weistein & 
Yafeh, 1998). In general, this literature suggests that business groups emerge to 
reduce transaction costs, which otherwise would be higher under a market system 
given the inadequacy of market mechanisms imder a market system.
From the sociological perspective, business groups are viewed as value- 
enhancing organizational forms with solidarity norms and codes of behavior 
(Granovetter, 1994). Scarcity of resources in emerging economies forces 
organizations to restrict activity to certain limited functions (specialization), which 
then requires exchange with other organizations (Cook, 1977). Firms form into 
groups as a result and develop exchange relationships among member firms. As such, 
business groups’ member relationships become solidified over time through repeated 
transactions.
Recently, the resource-based view has been used to conceptualize the 
existence o f diversified business groups. Guillen (2000) argued that firms and 
entrepreneurs enter into business groups in emerging economies so as to build an 
inimitable capability to combine domestic and foreign resources to enter markets 
quickly and more cost effectively. From the resource-based view, business groups 
exist not merely as market substitutes but as a source for member firms to accumulate 
capabilities and obtain knowledge.
Although the transaction cost, sociological, and the resource-based 
perspectives provide alternative explanations, each research stream has focused on 
the rationales for the emergence of diversified business groups. Because previous 
research has focused on rationales for the emergence of business groups, research on 
how a diversified business group is managed is rare. This dissertation extends the 
theories on the fit between organizational controls and strategy in the diversification 
literature to the diversified business group level. It highlights the importance of the 
adoption o f appropriate control mechanisms to realize the strategic benefits of a 
business group. By studying the management aspect o f a diversified business group, it 
is hoped that the understanding of both the diversification and business groups 
literatures will be deepened.
Research Question Three: The final research question examines how 
entrepreneurial growth is fostered in transition economies. Specifically, this study 
attempts to find out how government and business groups (as formal and informal 
institutions) affect economic growth of a country via their impacts on firms’ corporate 
entrepreneurial activities?
By addressing this question, this dissertation can enrich the understanding of 
wealth creation brought about by corporate entrepreneurship in the transition 
economies. This study attempts to integrate strategic management and corporate 
entrepreneurship theories by demonstrating that wealth creation via entrepreneurial 
growth in transition economies is induced by the creation of larger business groups 
(entrepreneurship) with government’s strategic commitment and support (strategy).
8instead of through small start-up firms as suggested by the corporate entrepreneurship 
literature.
Also, the lack of studies and measures regarding how diversified business 
groups have facilitated entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies is a 
conspicuous gap in the literature, although there is some literature (Leff, 1978; 
Leibenstein, 1968) on how governments have sought to use such groups to 
accomplish economic development. However, measurement from a firm level of 
analysis is lacking. Exploring the relationship between government and business 
groups in fostering entrepreneurial incentives can provide important implications to 
both public policy makers and managers.
Moreover, in the diversified business group literature, current studies have 
examined the effects o f business groups on economic development in emerging 
economies via their direct effects on firm performance such as profitability or growth 
(Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Chang & Choi, 1988; Keister, 1998; Khanna & Rivkin, 
2001; Khanna & Yafeh, 1999; Lincoln, et al., 1996; Nakatani, 1984). Nonetheless, 
entrepreneurship as a long-term growhh factor in economic development (Leibenstein, 
1968) has not been examined closely. In fact, business groups play an important role 
in contributing to economic development in transition and emerging economies 
through their entrepreneurial functions. For example, Leff (1978) notes that business 
groups have been, in effect, implemented as an optimizing macro strategy for 
economies where entrepreneurship is scarce. Consequently, to evaluate the real 
impact o f business groups on economic development, we need to include the
entrepreneurship dimension in the performance measures in order to examine how 
business groups facilitate the extension o f technical frontiers in emerging economies.
In conclusion, the central premise of this dissertation is to study the roles of 
formal (government) and informal (business groups) institutions, and their effects on 
firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity. This study aims to contribute to the 
literature on the relationship between institutions and organizations, diversification 
and business groups literature, and corporate entrepreneurship literature.
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
The remaining dissertation is organized into four chapters:
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature on diversified business groups. 
In this chapter, both the types and functions of diversified business groups are 
reviewed. Chapter 3 conceptualizes the theoretical framework of the study and 
hypotheses are developed. Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in this study. 
Details of research methods including sample, data collection method, measures, and 
analytical method are given. Chapter 5 reports the empirical findings. Chapter 6 
provides a discussion of the results, draws conclusion, and addresses implications. 
Also, a future research agenda based on the insights derived from the present findings 
is presented. The dissertation will end with a concluding remark.
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
What is a Diversified Business Group?
Diversified business groups dominate the economies o f most emerging 
countries around the world (Granovetter, 1994; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000b) and 
flourish in many developed economies as well. They are known in many countries 
under various names, the old zaibatsu and the modem keiretsu in Japan, the chaebol 
in Korea, the grupos economicos in Latin America countries such as Mexico and 
Nicaragua, the nventy-t\vo families o f Pakistan, the qiye jituan  in China, the quanxi 
qiye in Taiwan, and family groups in Britain, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, 
and Singapore. Despite the widespread existence of business groups, their 
institutional and strategic role in emerging markets is still poorly understood 
(Khanna, 2000). Some formal definitions o f diversified business groups in the 
current literature include:
“A group is a long term association of a great diversity of firms and 
the men who won and manage these firms.” (Strachan, 1976: 18)
“Business group are groups of companies that does business in 
different markets imder a common administrative or financial control”, 
and they are “linked by relations of interpersonal trust, on the basis of 
a similar personal, ethnic or commercial background.” (Leff, 1978: 
663)
“One can consider business groups those collections o f firms bound 
together in some formal and/or informal ways, characterized by an 
“intermediate” level of binding.” (Granovetter, 1995: 95)
“A business group is a set of firms which, though legally independent, 
are bound together by a constellation o f formal and informal ties and 
are accustomed to taking coordinated action.” (Khanna and Rivkin, 
2000)
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In general, a business group consists o f a collection of legally independent 
firms that are bound by economic and social ties. To date, the literature on business 
groups has been descriptive, detailing the characteristics o f diversified business 
groups under different country contexts. Empirical efforts have also examined the 
performance implications of diversified business groups. What follows is an overview 
of past literature on diversified business groups regarding three main aspects: 
structure, function, and performance implications. Table 1 summarizes the 
perspectives and findings o f current literature on diversified business groups.
Insert Table 1 About Here
Diversified Business Group: The Structural View
The structural aspect o f diversified business groups refers to the unique 
structural characteristics differentiating business groups from other organizational 
forms. I summarize the past literature by describing four dimensions o f the structural 
characteristics o f diversified business groups: organizational, economic, social, and 
institutional.
Organizational Ties
A diversified business group is well defined by its diversity o f economic 
activities and the diversity o f member firms (Strachan, 1976). Because member firms 
are involved in diverse industries and economic activities, diversity o f activities is a 
central characteristic of most business groups. Diversity o f members is another 
characteristic and refers to the uniqueness o f each member firm where each member
12
has its own needs, asset structures and capabilities, as well as contributions to the 
group (Chang & Choi, 1988; Strachan, 1976).
Organizational ties among members can be vertical or horizontal. For 
example, Japanese keiretsus are structured horizontally or vertically (Aoki, 1990; 
Gerlach, 1987). Horizontal keiretsus developed from the Zaibatsu after the Second 
World War. Each horizontal keiretsu is headed by a main bank. A central trading 
company, industrial firm, and insurance company also help provide group leadership 
and strategic coordination. A vertical keiretsu is headed by an industrial firm and 
affiliated with a main bank. Under the core industrial firm are affiliated suppliers and 
distribution member firms. In both vertical and horizontal keiretsu, member firms are 
in various industrial sectors. The groups may be integrated towards upstream, 
downstream or into related sectors. Similar membership structures can be found in 
Korean chaebols. However, the tighmess o f organizational ties varies by business 
groups. This indicates variations in the degree o f centralization in a group as 
described by Granovetter (1994). For instance, Taiwan’s guanxi giye are distinctive in 
that they are usually small firms horizontally organized without a unified 
management coordination system and are more loosely structured when compared to 
the Japanese keiretsus and Korean chaebols (Whitely, 1991).
Economic Ties
Ownership structure in a business group, according to Granovetter (1994), 
refers to the legal relations between the parent and its member firms. Although each 
of the member firms is an independent legal entity, it is owned directly or indirectly 
by one or more families as in the case o f the Korean chaebols (Chang & Choi, 1988),
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or a holding company as in the case o f the Mexican groups (cf. Granovetter, 1994). 
Additionally, there may be direct ownership ties between member firms and financial 
institutions as well as among member firms (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000). For instance, 
in the Japanese keiretsus, the “main banks” can hold more five percent o f equity 
shares in the keiretsu member firms (Aoki, 1990), and keiretsu affiliates may have 
significant equity links to each other (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Takahashi, 1992). Finally, 
indirect equity ties are also common in business groups (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000). 
Pyramidal ownership structure, or hierarchical chains of ownership, is also found in 
some business groups in both developed economies such as Italy (LaPorta, Lopes-de- 
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and in emerging economies such as India (Encamation, 
1989) and Indonesia (Schwartz, 1992).
Social Ties
As emphasized by past researchers, diversified business groups are well- 
known for their tight and stable social or relational ties among member firms. 
Strachan (1976) describes that a business group is circumscribed by a fiduciary 
atmosphere. This suggests that members are connected to each other through 
relational and social characteristics such as loyalty and trust. Granovetter (1994) 
stressed that what distinguishes business groups from groups of firms united on 
financial grounds is the existence o f social solidarity and the social structure among 
member firms. He proposed a structural dimension called the “axes o f solidarity”, 
which refers to the social structure underlying the legal and economic connections 
among member firms in a group. Social solidarity goes beyond the simple trust and 
loyalty as acknowledged by Strachan (1976) and emphasizes that the social
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connections among member firms are solidified by such factors as geographic region, 
political party, ethnicity, kinship, or religion. Leff (1978: 663) mentioned that 
“members of a business group are linked by relations o f interpersonal trust, on the 
basis of a similar personal, ethnic or communal background.”
Hence, it is not uncommon to find director interlocks as in the Japanese 
keiretsus (Goto, 1982) and the Chinese business groups (Keister, 1998); family ties as 
in the Korean chaebols where 31 percent of the executive officers were family 
members in the top twenty chaebols, and most core managerial positions are occupied 
by family members (Steers, Shin, & Ungson, 1989); kinship ties as in the Indian 
groups (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000), and school ties as in the Chinese (Keister, 1998) 
and Korean business groups (Ungson, Steers & Park, 1997).
In summary, the social structure of a business group reinforces a culture or a 
“moral economy” suggested by Granovetter (1994), which refers to the extent to 
which economic actions within a business group presuppose a moral community in 
which trustworthy behaviors are expected, normative standards are met, and 
opportunism is foregone.
Institutional Ties
Diversified business groups are considered as “substitutes for institutions” 
(Leff, 1976, 1978) or aids to overcoming an “institutional void” (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000b) in emerging economies. Structurally, business groups have close links with 
external institutions. Two major institutions play important roles in a business group: 
banks and financial institutions, and government. It is said that the “natural history” 
of business groups, those that do not affiliate with any financial institutions at their
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foundations, usually acquire a bank early in order to mobilize financial capital for 
member firms (Leff, 1978). The central position of main banks in the Japanese 
keiretsus, particularly the horizontal keiretsus, indicates the importance of the role of 
banks for the group (Aoki, 1990; Gerlach, 1992). The presence and predominance of 
banks and financial institutions are commonly found in Taiwan’s quanxi qiye as well. 
Thus, it is not imcommon to find banks as one of the structural components in many 
diversified business gioups.
The relations between governments and business groups are central in shaping 
the other dimensions mentioned above including ownership, authority structure, and 
relations o f groups to financial institutions (Granovetter, 1994). Many diversified 
business groups depend on government support. For instance, Korean chaebols and 
Taiwan’s quanxi qiye receive significant government support as they compete 
internationally (Keister, 2000). Chinese business groups are developed under the 
government’s “administrative guidance’’ in terms of propaganda and asset injections 
(Keister, 1998), and Indonesian business groups are dominated by the military in 
which the generals have persistently pushed business groups in the direction of 
becoming large conglomerates (cf. Granovetter, 1994).
In summary, the structure o f diversified business groups is well defined by 
diversity in membership, overlapping financial ties, close social relationships, and 
active involvements by banks or financial institutions and the state. Identifying these 
structural characteristics helps to facilitate understanding of the fimctions performed 
by diversified business groups.
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Diversified Business Groups: The Functional View
The functional view of diversified business groups refers to the kinds o f roles 
performed by business groups, and thus the reasons for their existence in the 
emerging economies. Researchers in several disciplines have theorized about the 
conditions under which diversified business groups become important actors in 
emerging economies. I categorize these functions into four major categories: 
economic, social, political and organizational.
Economic Function
The economic literature conceives o f diversified business groups as responses 
to market failures and associated transaction costs (Caves, 1989; Leff, 1976, 1978). 
Leff (1978: 667) explained that business groups are a “mechanism for dealing with 
deficiencies in the markets for primary factors, risk, and intermediate products in the 
developing countries.” He argued that firms in the emerging economies are faced 
with a choice between relying on inefficient market mechanisms to allocate resources 
or expanding their own operations to internalize resource allocation that would 
otherwise take place across market mechanisms. Business groups provide a third 
alternative by allowing firms to forego dealing in a market which is not efficient and 
thus fraught with significant transaction costs and to avoid relying on internal 
mechanisms that might not provide economies o f  scale in the emerging economies. 
In other words, business groups can be taken as the most efficient governance 
structures in the less developed economies for firms to economize on the transaction 
costs they would pay if relying on the market, and to receive the advantage of
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economies o f scale they would not gain if  they relied on themselves entirely (Goto, 
1982; Williamson, 1975). Thus, business groups are substitutes for market failures in 
mobilizing capital on the one hand and on the other hand, substitutes for organization 
failures in allocating resources efficiently without expanding the scale o f operation 
internally in the less developed cotmtries (Leff, 1978).
Extending the above arguments, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) specify the 
substitution roles o f diversified business groups in emerging economies. They 
proposed an “institutional void” framework in which they argued that business groups 
create economic value by filling the institutional voids in the capital market (creating 
an internal capital market for transferring funds and imderwriting security issues), 
market for managerial talents (rotating talent to member firms in need), input and 
product market (investing in an umbrella brand name and a reputation for fair 
dealing), and market for technology transfer (assimilating foreign technology through 
cooperative arrangements) in the emerging economies. In summary, diversified 
business groups perform an important role as market intermediaries in the emerging 
economies (Spulber, 1996).
Social Function
The economic approach has effectively explained the existence of diversified 
business groups. Yet, the stable pattern o f business groups in most of the less 
developed countries has not been addressed explicitly. By revisiting the Coase 
theorem (1937), Granovetter (1995) asked why firms aggregate into large entities 
called “business groups” which are often more stable and coherent than any literature
18
predicts. He challenged the economic notion that economic agents, no matter 
individuals or firms, can be understood independently o f individual ties to other 
agents. Such a seemingly well-accepted neoclassical economic assumption seems to 
be contradictory to the reality that firms fi-equently enter into alliances and conduct 
business as parts of groups. Granovetter (1995) explained that the choice of 
organizing economic exchange may not always be determined by economic rationales 
as the “minimum efficient scale” (Chandler, 1990) and “minimum transaction costs” 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), but may be affected by social factors such as symbolism, 
legitimacy, prestige, and power. In other words, market mechanisms may not 
adequately coordinate exchange among firms. So, according to Granovetter (1995), 
business groups coordinate interactions among firms just as firms coordinate 
interactions among individuals.
Therefore, the sociological school emphasizes that the formation of business 
groups may have nothing to do with a quest for economic gain, but for other goals 
such as legitimacy (Scott, 1987), prestige and power (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and 
social solidarity (Granovetter, 1995). The ultimate rationale for groups from this 
perspective is that firms become more isomorphic with their institutional environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Political Function
An important function of diversified business groups is their roles in fostering 
macroeconomic growth in emerging economies (Leff, 1978; Stark, 1996). Many 
business groups are formed as a direct result o f government’s economic policies. The
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notable examples are Korean’s chaebols which were formed as a result o f the 
aggressive export oriented development policy o f the Korean government (Chang & 
Choi, 1988; Guillen, 2000), and the formation of China’s business groups under 
government “administrative guidance’’ in the Economic Reform (Keister, 1998). 
Political connections are extremely important in emerging economies where an open 
market for political favors does not exist (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Thus, coordinated 
political lobbying can be taken as a response to market imperfections (Leff, 1978). 
Through the group, member firms are benefited by government preferential treatment 
such as for import licenses, bank charters, and tax and investment credits. In sum, 
although this is not in itself sufficient for explaining the existence of business groups, 
the political role played by the business groups is particularly dominant where the 
government has had a strong hand in their development. The literature suggests that 
this role has been particularly pertinent in business groups in Pakistan (White, 1974), 
Latin America (Strachan, 1976), Indonesia (Schwartz, 1992), Korea (Chang & Choi, 
1988; Guillen, 2000), and China (Keister, 1998; Peng, 2001).
Organizational Function
Diversified business groups have been conceptualized as similar to the 
multidivisional form organization (Encaoua & Jacquemin, 1982). Chandler (1982: 4) 
argued that “only the formation of a central administrative or corporate office can 
permit the group as a whole to become more than the sum o f its parts.” According to 
Chandler’s view, business groups must shift towards the multidivisional form to 
realize administrative efficiency. Recently, researchers have adopted a resource-
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based view to conceptualize the business group phenomenon. Chang and Hong 
(2000) conceptualized a diversified business group as a portfolio o f heterogeneous 
resources. Member firms not only enjoy the natural benefits resulting from a 
multidivisional structure, such as economies o f scale and scope, sharing resources and 
risks, and monitoring managers more effectively, but they can also benefit fi'om 
internal business transactions for the purpose of cross-subsidization. Guillen (2000) 
also approached the phenomenon of business groups in emerging economies from a 
resource-based view. He suggested that firms and entrepreneurs, by having access to 
business groups, could accumulate an inimitable capability to combine domestic and 
foreign resources to enter industries more quickly and cost-effectively in emerging 
economies. These two studies addressed directly cross-subsidization and capabilities 
generated by a business group that sustain unrelated diversification in the long am. 
However, additional work about how control systems in diversified business groups 
function to accomplish their organizational role is needed. Accordingly, this 
dissertation will partly address this issue.
In summary, diversified business groups are performing important economic 
roles in substituting market failures in emerging economies, social roles in solidifying 
inter-firm relationships in society, political roles in facilitating national policies, and 
organizational roles in creating a resource base for member firm. The functional view 
of business groups has made significant contributions to the field by calling attention 
to different configurations of possible capabilities facilitated by business groups and 
by providing a conceptual foundation for future studies.
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Diversified Business Groups: Performance Implications
Despite the value-added benefits as explained by a variety o f theoretical 
perspectives reviewed above, empirical evidence about the beneficial effects of 
business groups on economic development via their effects on the firm performance 
of member firms has remained mixed (Aoki, 1982; Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Chang & 
Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Leff, 1978; Lincoln, Gerlach & 
Ahmadjian, 1996; Stark, 1996).
Consistent with the literature, some studies have shown that business groups 
helped to create positive effects for member firms’ performance. Chang & Choi 
(1988) empirically showed that business groups with a multidivisional structure that 
reduces transaction costs and provides economies of scale and scope, e.g. the Korean 
chaebols, result in superior economic performance. Using panel data from 1988 to 
1990 on China’s 40 largest business groups and their 535 member firms, Keister 
(1988) found that the presence and predominance of interlocking directorates and 
finance companies in business groups improved the financial performance and 
productivity of member firms, and more centralized (centrally controlled) groups 
performed better than others. Perotti and Gelfer (2001) also provided evidence that 
group members have higher values of Tobin’s q than otherwise comparable 
independent firms in Russia.
On the other hand, there is also evidence that business groups result in a 
negative impact on firm performance. Caves & Uekusa (1976) and Nakatani (1984) 
both foimd a negative relationship between group membership and firm performance 
in the Japanese keiretsu. The negative results may be due to the fact that the higher
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costs of capital of the keiretsu firms may outweigh the benefits derived from the 
groups. In their words, “interests payments passing to the banks may be a conduit for 
group-derived rents.” (Caves & Uekusa, 1976: 78). The rent-appropriation by banks 
was empirically tested by Weistein and Yafeh (1999). They demonstrated that most 
of the benefits from the close relationship between banks and firms were appropriated 
by the banks. Therefore, bank-firm ties increased the availability o f capital to 
borrowing firms but did not lead to higher firm profitability or growth in times when 
access to capital markets was limited. But such findings should be weaker with the 
liberalization of Japan’s capital market which would reduce the bargaining power of 
banks. Outside of Japan, the negative relationship between group membership and 
firm performance was supported by Khanna and Yafeh (1999). In half of the ten 
emerging economies in their sample (e.g., Brazil, India, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand), 
the inter-temporal variance of firm profitability, measured by the ratio of operating 
returns to assets, was lower for group affiliates than non-group affiliates. These 
empirical results do suggest that there is, indeed, a cost of affiliating with business 
groups.
The mi.xed empirical findings on group-performance relationship may indicate 
that such relationships are not straightforward. There may be a curvilinear effect or 
the effect may depend on some contingencies. Past studies have explored several 
contingency variables on the group-performance relationship. First, the performance 
effect of group affiliation is contingent on the member position within the business 
group. Lincoln et al. (1996) found that there is a “redistribution effect” in the 
Japanese keiretsus where the stronger firms are taxed more to be in the group, which
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in turn, becomes a safety net for the weaker firms. In their study of 197 Japanese 
firms over a 24-year period, Lincoln and his colleagues (1996) found that weaker 
member firms benefit from group membership while stronger member firms do not. 
Accordingly, owing to such redistribution effects, there is much less variability in the 
performance of keiretsu firms relative to independent firms. Chang and Hong (2000) 
found similar results in the Korean chaebols. They pointed out that cross 
subsidization occurs when the outflow of financial resources, particularly in terms of 
debt guarantee variables, diminishes the profitability o f the providers and the inflow 
of such capital would increase the profitability of the recipients in the chaebols.
Second, the performance effects o f group affiliation may depend on covariates 
such as group size and group diversification. Khanna & Palepu (2000a) found a 
curvilinear relationship between firm performance and group diversification in the 
context o f Indian business groups. Accounting- and market-based measures of 
performance of member firms initially decline with group diversification and 
subsequently increase once group diversification exceeds a certain threshold level. 
These findings are replicated and supported in the Chilean business group context as 
well. Khanna & Palepu (2000b), using longitudinal data instead of cross-sectional 
data, as in the previous study, show that the threshold level increases over time while 
group benefits unrelated to diversification atrophy over time.
Finally, firm performance differences between group member firms and non­
member firms depend on a country’s institutional context. Khanna & Rivkin (2001) 
conducted a cross-country study on business groups. Among the fourteen emerging 
countries in Asia, Latin America and South Afiica, six o f the fourteen coimtry have
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business group affiliates outperformed comparable non-affiliates, three of them 
showed business group affiliates with lower profits, and the remaining five countries 
showed no statistically significant difference. They also found that the returns of 
group affiliates were more similar to one another than are the returns o f non-affiliates. 
These results implied that the impact of business groups on firm performance varies 
country by country. Groups exist to fill different institutional voids in different 
economies. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that the group-performance 
relationship is contingent on the institutional context.
In summary, the effects of group membership on firm performance remain 
inconclusive. Empirical findings in the past literature show both positive and negative 
effects of group membership on firm performance. Also, the relationship between 
group membership and member firm performance is contingent on country-specific 
factors such as institutional context, parent firm-specific factors such as group 
diversification, and member firm-specific factors such as member position in the 
group. This dissertation attempts to examine these covariates together. At the country 
level, formal institutions will be examined by looking at how government influences 
firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity. At the parent and member firm level, 
informal institutions will be examined by looking at the group’s control mechanisms 
facilitate the corporate entrepreneurial activities of its member firms. Besides, instead 
o f using accounting-based or financial-based performance measure, this study adopts 
the capability-based measure of performance, that is, corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity. Such a capability-based performance measure indicates how business 
group’s member firms engineer economic growth by extending the technological
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frontier of the economy. After reviewing the current literature on business groups, the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Overview of the Conceptual Model
Using an institutional economics perspective, this dissertation develops a 
model to examine the relationship between institutions and economic growth via their 
effects on firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity during institutional transition. As 
defined by North (1990), institutions are composed of formal rules (rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self- 
imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both. In the 
institutional void situation of transition economies, while government is the agency 
for enforcing the stable transition from old formal institutions to new formal 
institutions, the diversified business group is the agency for enforcing new, informal 
institutions. It is the mixture of the formal institutions, informal institutions, and 
enforcing characteristics that determines the economic performance o f the economy.
During institutional transition, firms are simultaneously facing the transitional 
effects of the two types o f institutions as mentioned above. In regard to formal 
institutions, government is the single agency to enforce the transition of formal 
institutions. To facilitate the transition, government will convert the old formal 
institutions into new ones and develop new formal institutions. Therefore, firms are 
facing some institutional legacy effects that are inherited fi'om the formal institutions 
in the pre-transition period. In this study, we will study two institutional legacy 
effects: administrative heritage and ownership heritage. At the same time, firms are
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facing effects from the new, formal institutions emerging during the transition period. 
In this study, we will examine the new economic reform policy as the new formal 
institution. While administrative heritage and ownership heritage are hypothesized to 
exert negative effects on firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity, reform policy is 
expected to have positive effects on firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity.
As for informal institutions, diversified business groups emerge as a new 
informal institution to foster a new way of doing business in transition economies, 
moving from state to market control of economic institutions. By implementing 
different types of control mechanisms (strategic controls, financial controls, and 
cultural controls), a new social norm (in terms of strategic mindsets, financial 
incentives, and cultural values) is developed among member firms in the business 
groups. The informal institutions facilitated by the three kinds o f control mechanisms 
are predicted to have positive effects on the corporate entrepreneurial intensity of 
member firms in a business group.
The overall theoretical model is presented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure I About Here
Institutions and Corporate Entrepreneurial Growth 
Institutions: Formal and Informal
According to North (1990:3), “institutions are the rules o f the game in a 
society, or more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether
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political, social or economic.” Institutions are composed o f formal rules such as 
constitutions, laws, and property rights, and informal constraints such as conventions, 
norms of behavior, and self-imposed codes o f conduct. Both formal and informal 
institutions are important in formulating an institutional matrix for wealth creation of 
an economy.
Institutions and Economic Growth
Formal Institutions
All kinds o f formal institutions are concerned with the organization of the 
polity (Mantzavinos, 2001). It is the polities significantly shape economic 
performance because they define and enforce the economic rules o f the game (North,
1990). Hence, government is regarded as the strategic agent for organizing the kinds 
of institutions (e.g. secure property rights and economic institutions) to foster 
economic growth. Extensive empirical evidence supports the relationship between 
formal institutions and economic development. For instance. Knack and Keefer 
(1995) have constructed indexes o f the security of property rights as strong predictors 
o f economic growth. Using the same data sources, they explained that institutional 
environment is the main obstacle for the convergence between the rich and the poor 
cotmtries (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Other studies have also found that economic 
growth is fostered by a quality institutional environment proxied by different 
indicators such as property rights protection, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of 
corruption (Alesina, 1998), property rights as measured by total credit allocated to
29
private enterprises as a percentage o f GDP (Leblang, 1996), and rule of law, risk of 
expropriation, and risk of repudiation (Olson, Sama, & Swamy, 2000).
Besides providing the appropriate formal institutions for economic growth, 
government has to have a credible commitment to maintaining economic growth as 
well (North, 1993). The maintenance of the rule of law is favorable to economic 
growth. In particular, polity design is indicative o f the credible commitment by the 
government to foster economic growth. Qian and Weingast (1997) argued that 
market-preserving federalism is the government’s commitment to foster long-run 
economic development in China.
However, one may observe that some countries differ in their economic 
performance even though they are having similar formal institutions. So, formal 
institutions are not a necessary condition for good economic performance of a 
country. In fact, Weingast (1993) argued that constitutions must be based on a 
respective constitutional culture in order to survive. This means that institutions or the 
rule o f law are themselves maintained by a set o f shared beliefs among citizens who 
react against the state when the latter attempts to transgress the boundaries defined by 
those institutions. Hence, a formal institutional firamework that is supportive of a 
wealth-creating economic regime has to be complemented by an appropriate informal 
institution framework. Next, I will examine how informal institutions will lead to a 
wealth-creating economy.
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Informal Institutions
Economies with the same formal institutional structure but different informal 
constraints are bound to result in different economic performance, as corroborated by 
the transformation from the command economy to a market economy in the Eastern 
European countries. Even the adoption of the basic principles o f the United States 
Constitution by South American countries did not lead to democracy and economic 
growth (North, 1991). Therefore, appropriate informal institutions are necessary to 
foster economic growth.
As such, how do informal institutions foster economic growth? First, 
informal institutions contribute to economic growth directly. Using the World Values 
Survey, La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishey (1997) found that trust is 
associated with per capita GND growth. Using the Chinese Cultural Survey, the 
Chinese Culture Connection (1987) found that there is a 0.7 correlation between 
Confucian work dynamism and economic growth. Temple and Johnson (1998) also 
found that a number of social variables are strong predictors of economic growth. 
Second, informal institutions foster economic growth through their association with 
formal institutions. Putnam (1993) states that “social context and history profoundly 
condition the effectiveness o f formal institutions” (p. 182). Knack and Keefer (1997) 
suggest that formal institutional rules are associated with the development of 
cooperative norms and trust.
In conclusion, either a formal or an informal institution in itself is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for facilitating economic growth. As proposed by North 
(1990), it is the creation o f a stable polity with complementary norms that is essential
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to foster good economic performance. However, one may expect that the absence of 
quality institutions will lead to obstacles for economic growth in transition 
economies. Interestingly, it is not uncommon to find that transition economies are the 
most rapid growth countries in the world. Why would this happen? North (1990) 
examined the relationship between institutions and organizations. He suggested that 
the institutional fi-amework dictates the kinds of skills and knowledge organizations 
must have to obtain the maximum payoffs. Therefore, expecting a market-oriented 
economy after transition, firms in transition economies are motivated to invest in 
skills and knowledge in order to survive in the future. This suggests a close 
relationship between institutional change and economic performance o f a country. 
Also, in transition and emerging economies, entrepreneurial growth extends the 
economic frontier of the country (Leff, 1978). Entrepreneurship activities are 
conducive to the economic development, and perform the role o f  wealth creation, of 
an economy. As such, the logic mentioned above would suggest a relationship 
between institutions and entrepreneurial growth in transition economies. This will be 
discussed next.
Institutions and Entrepreneurial Growth in Transition Economies
Corporate entrepreneurship can be defined as a process of product innovation, 
risk taking, and proactiveness (Colvin & Selvin, 1991; Miller, 1983). It often is 
defined as including two distinct but related dimensions: innovation and venturing, 
and strategic renewal (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). Innovation refers to firm’s 
commitment to creating and introducing new products, production processes, and
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organizational systems (Colvin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Venturing 
refers to new business entry by expanding operations and introducing new products in 
existing or new markets (Block & MacMillan, 1993). Strategic renewal refers to 
revitalizing the firm’s operations by changing the scope of business, competitive 
approach, or both (Stopford & Baden-Fuller, 1994; Zahra, 1993). Strategic renewal 
also includes acquiring new capabilities and creatively leveraging them to add 
shareholder value (Zahra, 1996). In this study, I categorize these different 
entrepreneurial activities into two main types based on a time horizon criterion. The 
first type is long-term entrepreneurial growth strategies including product 
innovations. The second type is short-term entrepreneurial growth strategies pursued 
through acquisitions and exports.
Corporate entrepreneurship is directly related to corporate diversification. 
Burgelman (1983) examined the process whereby firms engage in diversification 
through internal venture development. Such diversification requires new resource 
combinations to extend the firm’s activities into areas unrelated, or marginally 
related, to its core competence and corresponding opportunity set. The result of such 
internal venturing may be a change in the pattern o f relatedness in the portfolio o f the 
firm’s businesses (Ginsberg, 1988).
Additionally, central to the notion of entrepreneurship is the concept of 
uncertainty (Jones & Butler, 1992). Entrepreneurship is a process by which firms 
notice opportimities, involves a causal understanding about the inputs, combinations 
and results expected fi'om the deployment o f factors o f production, and assembling 
and coordinating new combinations of resources to extract increased profits fi'om
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these innovations (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1993; Jones & butler, 1992; McGrath, 
Venkataraman, & MacMillan, 1994). As such, an entrepreneurial firm is said to be 
have an innovative, risk-taking, and proactive orientation (Colvin & Selvin, 1991). 
According to the resource-based view, corporate venturing may become a difficult-to- 
imitate routine, which can sustain the strategic competitiveness o f a firm (Barney,
1991).
Because of their value-creating potential, entrepreneurial activities are 
conducive to economic growth and development o f a national economy. Economists 
and sociologists emphasize the role o f entrepreneurship in creating wealth in an 
economy. In addition to the contribution to economic growth by capital, labor, and 
technology as proposed by the general equilibrium theory, Schumpeter (1934) 
suggests that entrepreneurship creates wealth by the process o f “creative destruction” 
to create new demand while destroying existing market structures. Sociologists 
recognize the importance of interrelationships among different institutional 
components within the socio-economic system. Sociologists emphasize how 
entrepreneurship is affected by societal characteristics such as the historical changes 
of a nation’s modernization process as well as the role o f the state in economic 
development (Reynolds, 1991).
In transition and emerging economies, entrepreneurship is likely to be more 
necessary for output expansion and structural change as compared to more developed 
cotmtries (Leff, 1978). The political, economic, and social environments are unstable 
during the transition period in many transition and emerging economies (Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000). However, these turbulences give rise to many
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opportunities for entrepreneurial activities, which in turn, help to transform emerging 
economies in vital and fundamental ways. Therefore, the complexity and uncertainty 
triggered by environmental turbulence act as a major catalyst for entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies. Peng (2000: 102) concludes that “the more dynamic, 
hostile, and complex the environment, the higher the level of innovation, risk-taking, 
and proactivity among the most successful entrepreneurial firms.” Entrepreneurship 
as an outcome of institutional and organizational transformation is also reflected 
through privatization in most transition and emerging economies (Zahra, Ireland, 
Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). After being privatized, firms are required to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities, risk taking, and innovation in order to achieve efficiency, 
improve productivity, and create wealth (Baumol, 1996). As such, entrepreneurial 
transformation is a key to organization transforming from what is often a state-owned 
status to one of competing in a market-based economy (Zahra, et al., 2000). As a 
consequence, entrepreneurship is flourishing in transitional economies o f Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union and East Asia (Peng, 2001; 
Zahra, et al., 2000; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz & Dial, 2000).
Even though entrepreneurship is a vehicle for engineering economic growth in 
transition and emerging economies, such transformation is more difficult in these 
countries due to the lack of appropriate institutional and resource environments, and 
hence, results in different economic outcomes. Newman (2000) suggests that there is 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between institutional-level change and 
organizational transformation. She argues that extreme change in the institutional 
context will inhibit firms’ organizational transformation because second-order
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organizational learning will be inhibited. Successful organizational transformation 
and entrepreneurial activity in transition and emerging economies requires 
complementarity institutional transformation that includes a stable and predictable 
institutional context, and the emergence o f a social consensus about new values, 
norms, and assumptions that underpin economic activity.
Johnson, Smith, and Codling (2000) point out that although most o f the 
institutional changes are taking place in the private sector, governments are getting 
involved through formal or informal means. The importance of infrastructure in 
facilitating entrepreneurship should not be ignored. Infrastructure including 
institutional arrangements to legitimate, regulate, and standardize a new technology; 
public resource endowments o f basic scientific knowledge, financing mechanisms, 
and a pool of competent labor; as well as proprietary R&D, manufacturing, 
marketing, and distribution functions by private entrepreneurial firms to 
commercialize the irmovation for profit are all necessary for entrepreneurship (Van de 
Yen, 1993). In a similar vein, studies also empirically found that environmental and 
contextual factors have significant impacts on entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1993; Zahra 
& Covin, 1995).
In summary, given that the idiosyncrasies o f an economy’s structure can 
profoundly affect the rules o f exchange in its markets (North, 1990), institutional 
characteristics can have major impacts on the outcomes that transition and emerging 
economies can achieve through entrepreneurial growth. In this study, China is 
selected as the context for institutional transition due to its gradual transition from a 
communist, command economy to a socialist, market economy. Because China’s
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setting is unique in examining the roles o f formal and informal institutions in 
institutional evolution, the focus of my arguments now examines this particular 
institutional transformation.
Institutional Transition in the Transition Economy of China
Since the inauguration of its Economic Reform in 1979, China has been 
transitioning from a centrally planned economy to market-based economy. This 
process took place without democratization, while liberalization proceeded 
incrementally, and privatization occurred only gradually. So far, the economic reform 
and transition has brought remarkable success to China. Its GDP per capita 
quadrupled in the last two decades (Qian, 2000) and its economic growth has been 
sustained at 8 % every year (Economist, March 10, 2001). China accounts for three 
quarters of the population and more than one half o f the total GDP among all 
transition economies (Qian, 2000). Furthermore, it is forecasted that China’s 
economic growth will continue to be remarkable in the future. The Economist 
forecasts that if China continues to move towards a market-based economy and sticks 
to its commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO), it will grow at 7 % till 
the year 2005; and by 2020, it would have grown to 10 trillion dollars, making it the 
size o f United States economy today. And there is the prospect of some 40 trillion 
dollars of new wealth over the next 15-20 years created by the Chinese reforms (The 
Economist, March 10, 2001). The remarkable economic growth of China is a direct 
result of its Economic Reform.
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The Economic Reform
China’s economic reform started off in 1978, after the death o f Mao Zedong. 
The aim of the economic reform was, like other former socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, to introduce market institutions into an 
economy that had been dominated by state planning for several decades (Jefferson, 
Rawski, & Zheng, 1992). On the whole, the Chinese government’s objective is to 
develop a socialist market economy -  a market-based economy with capitalist 
features and Chinese socialist characteristics simultaneously. Rather than using a 
“big bang” approach that aimed at transforming to a Westem-style market system in a 
revolutionary way as in Eastern Europe, China’s economic reform adopted a 
“gradualism” approach that followed an evolutionary path, with bottom-up initiatives, 
experimentation, learning, and adaptation at the core of the reform process. This 
gradual learning approach in carrying the Economic Reform was exemplified by the 
analogy used by the previous political leader of China, Deng Xia Ping, as “touching 
the stones when crossing the river”. Naughton (1994) describes China’s economic 
reform is more akin to “growing out of the plan”. On the one hand, the gradual reform 
approach can ensure more stability during the transition; on the other hand, it is also 
not surprising to find that the gradual and uneven institutional change has resulted in 
many features of the pre-reform system remaining today (Jefferson & Rawski, 1994).
According to Qian (2000), China’s transition journey can be analyzed as a 
two-stage process. The first stage (1979-1993) is the period of reforming the planned 
economy. In these first fifteen years, efforts were made to unleash the standard forces 
of incentives, hard budget constraints, and competition by implementing several
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mechanisms: reforming government by regional decentralization, entry and expansion 
o f non-state enterprises, financial stability through “financial dualism”, and a “dual­
track” approach to market liberalization. Regional decentralization refers to the 
delegation o f government authority from the central to local levels of governments. 
Entry and expansion o f non-state enterprise refers to the encouragement o f growth in 
the non-state sector. In China, state sector refers to the state-owned enterprises while 
non-state sector comprises all other types of firms including collective enterprises and 
private enterprises in the urban areas as well as private firms, and township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) which are community public firms in the rural areas. The 
growth of TVEs is particularly emphasized in the economic reform. Financial 
stability through “ financial dualism” refers to the decline of government fiscal 
revenues from direct taxation, and the increase in quasi-fiscal revenues from the 
banking sector by relaxing regulations on the use of cash for transaction and 
household deposits. Finally, the dual track approach to market liberalization refers to 
the price liberalization policy in which free market prices are introduced while 
planned prices and quota are maintained and phased out gradually.
The second stage (1994-present) is the period of replacing the planned 
economy with a market economy (Qian, 2000). In these years, the aim is to build a 
rule-based system incorporating international best practice institutions but to proceed 
in way that is peculiar to China. Several major reforms were introduced during this 
stage. First, unification of exchange rates was implemented to completely abolish the 
official prices imder the plan track but rely on the single market price system. Second, 
a major tax and fiscal reform was undertaken to further align the Chinese system with
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international practices. The central and local governments are responsible for each of 
their tax revenues. In addition to the tax reform, the “Budget Law” was passed to 
require local governments to have their budgets balanced. As such, the budgets of 
local governments were further hardened. Third, a “Central Bank Law” was passed to 
give the central bank the mandate for monetary policy independent of local 
governments. The reorganization of the central bank minimized the local government 
influence on monetary policies and hardened the local governments’ budgets. Fourth, 
downsizing of government bureaucracy was carried out to cut the ties between police, 
military, judiciary on the one hand and business enterprises on the other hand, so as to 
reduce corruption and smuggling. Finally, the process of privatization and 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises, which was delayed in the first stage of the 
reform, was speeded-up. All these mechanisms transformed China into a more 
market-based economy.
Two fundamental principles were carried out throughout the Economic 
Reform to facilitate economic growth. First, there is a gradual change of formal 
institutions enforced by the government. The core of the formal institutional change is 
the creation of a market-persevering federalism (Qian & Weingast, 1997) - 
decentralizing the power from the central government to local governments. Second, 
informal institutions emerged to substitute for market failures in the transition 
economy o f China. The Chinese government encourages the development of 
diversified business groups that resemble the Japanese keiretsus and Korean chaebols. 
Diversified business groups play an important role in instilling and enforcing a new 
norm of business practices in China, or what is officially called “corporatization” that
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refers to modernizing the Chinese enterprises into enterprises like corporations in the 
West. In the following, I will examine the transition o f formal and informal 
institutions in China respectively.
Formal Institutions in the Transition Economy of China
As previously defined, formal institutions refer to the rules, laws, and 
constitutions that regulate economic exchange in a society (North, 1990). Given the 
absence of a well-developed market and legal system, government is the second best 
formal institution and is said to be the substitute for institutional failures in the 
transition economy (Qian, 2000). Government, as the polity, plays a critical role in 
shaping the development o f formal institutions in the economy (North, 1990). China 
has adopted a nested, tiered government system with a clear hierarchical ordering 
from the central government at the top to the local governments comprising 
provincial, prefectures, counties, township and village government, and street 
committees underneath. Each tier o f government is nested in the upper tier of 
governments. In China, firms are organized into a nested hierarchy in which different 
levels of government control firms at different levels of this hierarchy. Figure 2 gives 
the general picture of the tiered structure o f government system in China.
Insert Figure 2 About Here
Under the Economic Reform in China, the government system was reformed 
by a means known as regional decentralization. Regional decentralization refers to the 
decentralization o f government authority from the central to local levels of
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governments (Keister, 1998 ; Li, 1995). Under regional decentralization, a major tax 
and fiscal reform was undertaken to further align the Chinese system with 
international practices. Under such reform, central and local governments are now 
responsible for their own tax revenues. In addition to the tax reform, the “Budget 
Law” was passed to require local governments to balance their budgets. As such, the 
budgets o f local governments were further hardened. Another aspect o f regional 
decentralization is the experimentation with economic development at regional 
government levels. In China, the government adopted a gradual, bottom-up approach 
to adjust itself to the increasing market pressures resulted from institutional transition. 
At the regional level, local governments are encouraged to expand growth outside the 
state sector by developing non-state enterprises. The experimentation of collective 
enterprises plus township and village enterprises are examples o f such a bottom-up 
approach o f the government increasing its exposure to market pressures. Research has 
found that fiscal incentives are associated with faster development of non-state 
enterprises and more reforms in state-owned enterprises (Jin, Qian, & Weingast,
1999). All these reforms under regional decentralization have important implications 
for China’s economic sector of since there is a tighter relationship between polity and 
economy. Such a tight relationship implies the significant influence o f government in 
shaping the formal institutions developing in China.
The new polity design resulting from regional decentralization in the 
Economic Reform shows a commitment of the government in fostering wealth 
creation for the economy. Nonetheless, in addition to the credible commitment, 
government also has to be an effective agency for enforcing the formal institutions to
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facilitate economic growth. Two important formal institutions are necessary for good 
economic development to result from transitioning to a market economy; clearly 
secured property rights and a set of economic institutions guaranteeing an open 
market (Hayek, 1973; North and Weingast, 1989). These two formal institutions are 
still underdeveloped in China. Therefore, although the credible commitment of the 
polity is there, the exact content of these formal institutions is yet to be completed.
In consequence, the legacy of old formal institutions in the pre-reform era 
remains and may impose constraints on economic growth. Simultaneously, 
govenunent is committed to fostering rapid economic growth by carrying out the 
Economic Reform. Such old and new formal institutions are, therefore, predicted to 
impose contradictory impacts on firms’ strategies and economic growth.
Informal Institutions in the Transition Economy of China
Informal institutions refer to the norms of behavior, conventions, and self- 
imposed codes o f conduct that regulate economic exchanges in a society (North, 
1990). Because informal constraints embodied in the customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies, they play a more important 
role in regulating economic exchange during the transition when formal institutions 
are being weakened and reestablished (North, 1990). Informal institutions have 
considerable influence over the behavior o f individuals and firms as well as the 
generation of new formal constraints (Peng & Heath, 1996). Informal institutions are 
said to substitute for market failures in transition economies.
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Past literature has highlighted the importance of informal institutions in 
facilitating market transactions in the transition economy o f China. As pointed by 
Boisot and Child (1996), instead of following the straight path from bureaucracy to 
market capitalism, the Chinese path to modernization evolves from a “fiefs” system 
towards “network capitalism”. A fiefs system refers to a clan-based transaction 
governance system in which information is asymmetrically diffused among members 
in the clan, while network capitalism is a decentralized clan-based market order that 
is not based on Western institutions such as property rights but depends very much on 
trust and longstanding personal relationships. Adopting the unidimensional 
continuum of markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975), the transacting or 
governance mode of China’s network capitalism is somewhere in between these two 
polar continuum points. In all, networking that is based on informal institutions 
becomes the dominant logic for firms (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) in the transition 
economy of China.
Seeing the success of the Japanese keiretsus and Korean chaebols, the 
Chinese government claimed that another major principle of the China’s Economic 
Reform is the creation of diversified business groups. In the following, I will describe 
the Chinese Business Groups in more details.
Formation o f  Chinese Business Groups
The emergence of China’s business groups is a direct result o f the Chinese 
Economic Reform. The Chinese government carried out different privatization and 
corporatization programs to enhance the financial performance and efficiency of 
national enterprises. One of the dedicated efforts is to transfer the control of state-
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owned enterprises from the government to newly emerging business groups or known 
as qiye jituan (Keister, 1998). Because of the success of the Japanese keiretsus and 
the Korean chaebols, the Chinese policy makers aimed to replicate their neighbor’s 
success, and permit firms to acquire ownership rights in each other and to reduce their 
roles to that of a shareholder with limited liability and voting authority in the mid- 
1980s (cf. Keister, 2000; Li, 1995). In the inaugural year of the Economic Reform, 
the Communist Party Central Committee declared that the state would actively 
support the formation of business groups. Later, official documents including the 
“Provisional Regulations Regarding the Promotion of Economic Alliances in 1980, 
the “State Council Related to the Further Promotion for Lateral Economic Alliances’’ 
in 1986, and “A Few Ideas Regarding the Establishment and Development of 
Business Groups’’ in 1987, were released in which the state declared that the Chinese 
government regarded business groups as a means of achieving broad-based 
sustainable economic development and growth (Keister, 2000). Also, 1997 was a 
critical year in the development of Chinese business groups. The State Council 
released an official document No. 15, in which the President o f China, Jiang Jiemin, 
urged that the Chinese government concentrate its efforts in strategically restructuring 
the existing state-owned enterprises into diversified business groups that are based on 
cross-ownership, cross-regions, cross-industries, and cross-national foundations 
(China Economic Review, 1998). This symbolized the central role played by business 
groups in the Chinese economy.
Specific goals that it was believed business groups could accomplish included: 
cost efficiency through economies o f scale, better coordination of management of
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individual enterprises, decrease in the reliance of firms on the state to cover operating 
deficits, improved firm performance, increased total output, improved relations 
among firms and scientific research institution, improved research and development 
in order to decrease reliance on foreign technology, enhanced international 
competitiveness, and the protection of firms from competition (Li, 1995).
By 1999, there were 2,767 business groups in China with total assets o f over 
US$10 trillion which contribute close to 60 percent of the nation’s industrial output 
(China Economic Yearbook, 2000; China Statistical Yearbook, 2000). Overall, the 
average annual growth rate o f the Chinese business groups in terms of sales was 
13.55 % in 1999. Business groups are providing enormous economic growth in 
various industries as well. Among the industries, the annual sales growth is 20.8 % in 
the refinery sector, 12.33 % in the manufacturing sector, 47.05 % in the 
telecommunication sector, and 3.65 % in the construction sector, respectively (China 
Economic Yearbook, 2000). Moreover, Chinese business groups also achieved 
remarkable global performance. In 1999, for the first time, five of the Chinese 
business groups were ranked among the Fortune 500 global companies. And within 
only fourteen years from the beginning o f the company, the Lianxiang Group was 
ranked among the top ten personal computers manufacturers in the world in 1997 
(China Economic Yearbook, 1998, 2000). These statistics indicate the significant 
economic impact of Chinese business groups both in the domestic and global 
economy.
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Types o f  Chinese Business Groups
There are two types o f business groups in China. The first type of Chinese 
business groups resembles the Taiwanese guanxi qiye. The major characteristic of 
this type of business groups is that they are composed of small private firms with 
family ties or other forms o f social connections, more predominant in low-tech and 
light industries where there is a high proportion of private and start-up firms, located 
more in the marketized regions, relations among member firms tend to be informal, 
and group management tend to be loose (Keister, 2000). The second type consists of 
large-scale enterprise groups that resemble the Japanese keiretsus and the Korean 
chaebols. This dissertation focuses on the second type o f Chinese business groups 
because it is the more prominent form o f business groups in China. These large 
Chinese business groups are more geographically diverse and are formed primarily in 
the manufacturing sector and the “central industries” including the automotive, steel, 
petroleum, power, transportation, and high-tech industries.
Group Structure
Typically, the structure of a Chinese business group consists of three 
components. At the center of the group is the core firm or parent firm that is usually 
a large industrial or commercial enterprise. The second component is the member 
firms that are either vertically or horizontally related to the parent firm. Similar to the 
keiretsus or the chaebols, business groups in China are infused with elaborate inter­
firm relations. According to Li (1995), member firms are boimded together by 
director ties (interlocking directorates), financial ties (cross-shareholdings and debt
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relations), commercial or product-based ties (long-term supplier relations, joint 
production and R&D), and personnel ties (personnel exchange, joint training). The 
third component involves other member firms that are not directly involved in the 
production but vital to the functioning o f the group. These firms act like specialized 
functional groups that might be part of staff groups in a western diversified company 
to fulfill specific functional needs of all group member firms. In most cases, there is 
a finance company, a research and development company, an administrative 
company, and occasionally an import-export company, a marketing company, and an 
education or training institute (Keister, 2000). The basic structure of a Chinese 
business group is a three-tiered structure, with the parent firm at the top, the 
production member firms and non-production member firms in the middle, and their 
affiliated subsidiaries at the bottom. Figure 3 gives an example of the structure o f a 
typical Chinese business group.
Insert Figure 3 About Here
Advantages Given By Business Groups
In general, being a member of a diversified business group in China has three 
major advantages.
The first advantage that firms can gain from business groups is the reduction 
of transaction costs. In China, given a lack of clear property rights and legal regime, 
transaction costs incurred by internalization or acquisition tend to be high because 
both strategic options involve bureaucratic costs and/or transfer of ownership. In 
contrast, a group-based strategy, although it also incurs high coordination costs to
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establish and coordinate the elaborate web of relations (Boisot & Child, 1996; Jarillo, 
1988; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), nonetheless, the costs o f networking are lower than 
the costs of otherwise being unable to complete the necessary transactions through 
either the market or the hierarchy (Peng & Heath, 1996). And the costs per 
transaction can be reduced when the scale, scope, and specificity of transactions 
among members within the business groups increases. In addition, the threat of 
opportunism is limited through relational contracting, thus saving monitoring costs 
(Chang & Choi, 1988).
Second, business groups are suited to handling the uncertainty and complexity 
in the China’s institutional environment (Boisot & Child, 1996). Two types of 
uncertainties exist during the reformation of the China economy: the first type is 
economic uncertainty that arises from the tightening of fiscal constraints in the 
transition away from the planned economy, and the second type is administrative 
uncertainty faced by the firms that are located at the highest level o f government 
administration and assume the greatest amoimt of responsibilities to produce the 
transition (Guthrie, 1997). Sustained by reciprocal, preferential, and mutually 
supportive trust-based relationships (Peng & Heath, 1996), business groups provide 
greater capacities for generating and exchanging information, thus offering a cushion 
against the possibility o f failure that is concomitant with uncertainty.
Third, the most important advantage firms can gain fi"om joining business 
groups is the economic strength resulting from the collaboration between the state and 
the groups. These “patronage networks” (Boisot & Child, 1996) are built upon 
personal ties between firms and officials. While firms can benefit fi-om non-tradable
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political resources and protection, governments benefit fi-om the tax revenues for 
local economic growth. By spanning the boundary between the public and private 
sectors (Nee, 1992), the quasi-market networks become a peculiar economic strength 
in the transition economy o f China.
In summary, because o f their superior adaptive capacity, hybrid organizational 
forms flourish during the period of rapid institutional change and become a 
requirement for facilitating the planned economic transition (Nee, 1992; Stark, 1992). 
Diversified business groups are regarded as the engine for economic growdh and they 
act as an agency for enforcing a new kind of social norms in China.
HYPOTHESES
The context of this study is the member firms of a diversified business group 
in the transition economy of China. During institutional transition, member firms are 
facing forces from both the transitioning formal and informal institutions. In this 
study, I focus the main form al institutional forces as those from the transitional 
government that is conceptualized as the agency for enforcing the transition of formal 
institutions in the economy. As for informal institutions, I focus on the forces from 
the diversified business group that is conceptualized as the agency for enforcing new 
norms of business practices during transition. Member firms in a diversified business 
group are under dual influence fi-om both formal and informal institutions. 
Government, with its heritage effects carried over from the previous planned 
economy period and reforming effects in the institutional transition period, are 
hypothesized to have both positive and negative relationships with firm corporate
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entrepreneurial intensity. Diversified business groups, which serve like a 
multidivisional form to maximize the strategic benefits of their member firms via the 
group control mechanisms, are hypothesized to positively influence corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity. The proposed empirical model is summarized in Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4 About Here
I. Formal Institutions and Economic Growth:
Government Influence and Corporate Entrepreneurial Intensity of Member 
Firms in a Diversified Business Group
Institutional transition is a process o f incremental changes, which “consists of 
marginal adjustments to the complex rules, norms, and enforcement that constitute 
the institutional framework” (North, 1990; 83). During institutional transition, one 
set o f beliefs and practices will be weakened and disappear and is likely to be 
associated with the arrival of new beliefs and practices (Scott, 2001). So, there will 
be a period of time in which both the old and new institutions co-exist. Such 
coexistence o f old and new institutions is likely to give rise to considerable upheaval, 
chaos, and increased transaction costs (Meyer & Rowan, 1997; North, 1990). In 
transition economy, the coexistence of old and new institutions will have different 
impacts on the progress o f economic growth. In this study, I will examine how the old 
institutions new institutions trigger conflicting effects on member firms’ corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity in the diversified business groups in the transition economy 
of China. Past research suggests two main dimensions of corporate entrepreneurship: 
irmovation and strategic renewal (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). Innovation refers to the
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firm’s commitment to creating and introducing new products, production processes, 
and organizational systems (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Strategic 
renewal refers to revitalizing the firm’s operations and building or acquiring 
capabilities (Zahra, 1993, 1996). This study focuses on these two dimensions o f 
corporate entrepreneurship in the context o f transition economies. Specifically to the 
context of transition economies where the product and technological markets are still 
underdeveloped, corporate entrepreneurial intensity is defined as the extent to which 
firms engage in innovation and strategic renewals that are exemplified by internal 
capabilities building including product capabilities building, technological 
capabilities building, and marketing capabilities building.
Government Heritage From Old Formal Institutions
A difference between Chinese business groups and other Asian counterparts is 
that social relations, while important, played a minor role in group formation (Keister, 
1998). Instead, government is heavily involved in the formation and development of 
diversified business groups in China. In this study, I focus on two types of 
government heritage: administrative heritage and ownership heritage.
Administrative Heritage
Firms are as captives of their past (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). According to 
Barlett and Ghoshal, administrative heritage refers to an organization’s way of doing 
things, which is shaped by its founder and leader, norms, values, and behaviors of 
managers, and organizational history (Barlett & Ghoshal, 1989). Because
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administrative heritage is unique and ingrained in a firm, changes in competitive 
strategy or in formal organizational structure is difficult unless it is accompanied by 
matching changes in the firms’ values and management processes. Therefore, any 
change must begin with an understanding of the firm’s administrative heritage. In the 
context o f Chinese business groups, government exerts great administrative heritage 
effects on member firms in two major ways.
First, an administrative heritage force unique to the member firms of a 
Chinese business group is firm founding. Firm founding casts a long shadow on a 
firm’s adaptive abilities and has long-term influence on a firm’s structure and strategy 
(Stinchombe, 1965). Stinchcombe posited that there is a close relationship between 
social structure and firm founding. The economic and technical conditions determine 
the appropriate organization form for a given organizational purpose and postulate 
that certain kinds of organizations could not be invented before the social structure 
was appropriate to them. Take the case of automobile industry as an example, 
Stinchcombe (1965) argued that the automobile industry could not be invented until 
organizational forms appropriate to large-scale factories and nationwide distribution 
systems were in place. The same logic applies to the transition economy of China.
The founding modes of Chinese business groups have reflected the 
transitioning natiu-e of institutional change in China. Directing towards a market 
economy, some business groups are formed through the market means: greenfield 
investment or mergers and acquisitions. For example, the China’s First Motor Group 
was founded with 25 mergers and acquisitions 1992. The group now has 36 factories.
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11 wholly-owned subsidiaries, 12 subsidiaries with majority shares, 17 joint ventures, 
and 246 affiliate firms (China Industrial Development Report, 1998).
However, most o f the Chinese business groups were formed via the centrally 
planned means. That is, they were founded by the government directly or indirectly 
through administrative restructuring. As mentioned above, the institutional support 
environment and firm foimding is closely related. The administrative restructuring of 
the Chinese business groups is due to a lack of well-established formal institutions 
such as capital, labor, and product and technology markets in China. One way of 
administrative restructuring by the government is that the parent firm is established 
first and member firms are subsequently added to the business group. Alternatively, 
the member firms are bundled together into a business group through administrative 
restructuring and the parent firms are established later.
The former administrative restructuring is the more typical way of forming 
business groups in China and it is undertaken in two ways. One way is through a 
contracting system in which diversified business groups were formed through the 
authorization of state-owned enterprise operation rights granted by the government 
(China Economic Yearbook, 1999; Li, 1995). Under this contracting system, the 
state-owned enterprise management bureau (a centralized bureau that oversees all 
state-owned enterprises) reorganized those state-owned enterprises that used to have 
close relationships with each other and granted the core state-owned enterprise the 
right to operate and manage all these state-owned enterprises. The core state-owned 
enterprise becomes the parent firm of the business group and the other inter-related 
state-owned enterprises become the member firms.
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Another way to establish a business group through administrative means is 
transferring an existing industrial bureau into a business group system. Through this 
administrative restructuring, all the firms under the industrial bureaus become 
member firms of a specific business group. An example is the Shougang Enterprise 
Group in the steel sector was merged with 13 industrial ministries and became one of 
the largest business groups in China. And recently, the Chinese government also 
restructured the largest ten ministries into five business groups (China Economic 
Yearbook (2000).
The third way is through the approval o f  the merger o f large firms into 
business groups in particular industrial sectors by the government. According to the 
China Economic Yearbook (2000), the Chinese government approved the formation 
of several giant business groups by merging the top two in the oil and chemical 
industry, the big three in the metal industry, and the top four in the 
telecommunication industry. Large-scale administrative restructuring in the air and 
transportation sector is in progress as well.
Notwithstanding the formation approach, whether by government 
administrative or through the market-based means, the groups are required to get 
approval by and register with the government bureau most closely related to it. The 
process of approval and registration is regarded as a vehicle by which the state 
continues to retain control over the firms by exerting influence on matters of 
certification; for instance, which firms join which groups and where the groups 
acquire raw materials (Keister, 2000; Li, 1995). From this, it can be concluded that
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member firms of business groups are under great influence from the government 
especially during the founding stage of their historical context.
The administrative heritage forces via firm founding may indicate that the 
redistributive mindset of the government as the founder exist while the corporate 
entrepreneurial mindset is lacking. After combining member firms through an 
administrative approach, excessive and unrelated resources cannot be sold off in the 
external markets. This leads to efficiency problems. For instance, the core firm of the 
Northeast Electricity Group has 100,000 employees but only a quarter of them are 
sufficient for efficient operation (China Economic Yearbook, 1996).
Another example is that when facing the harder budget constraints, some local 
governments wanted to lessen their burden and force the business groups to absorb 
the less performing state owned enterprises in their justifications (China Economic 
Yearbook, 2000). This led to duplication of resources and high debt level in some of 
the business groups. The debt-to-asset ratio of the Heavy Motor Group and the 
Oriental Group were 85% and 89%, respectively (China Economic Yearbook, 1996). 
So, the high debt burden makes firms less likely to undertake expensive long-term 
corporate entrepreneurial activities such as research and development. This indicates 
that the socialist objective o f providing job opportunities still predominates, making 
organizational change to be more market-oriented and entrepreneurial difficult. As 
such, it is predicted that government influence in firm founding will lead to lower 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity in member firms.
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Hypothesis 1: Government influence via firm founding is negatively related to 
the corporate entrepreneurial intensity of member firms in a 
business group.
Second, government influences member firms o f diversified business groups 
by means of its influence over the selection of the CEO and board of directors. As 
previously mentioned, most of the member firms are transferred from former state- 
owned enterprises and industrial bureaus with a heritage o f strong government 
influence. Therefore, the employees of the previous state-owned enterprises and the 
government officials of the previous industrial bureaus would remain in the business 
groups. It is not uncommon to find that the CEOs and board of directors of the 
member firms are usually either the former government officials working in the 
industrial bureaus or are selected under great government influence. Sometimes, the 
CEO is even appointed by the government (China Economic Yearbook, 1996). Thus, 
although the non-separation between government administration and corporatization 
in the pre-reform era was achieved in a legal sense, the corporate mindset is still 
absent in the existing pool of managers and board of directors. The CEO and board of 
directors act like a government ministry as they were in the pre-reform era, and move 
forward using their stewardship to fulfill the social objectives and near-term interests 
of government. Also, due to the different jurisdictions these government officials and 
managers belonged to previously, they tend to perceive that they should focus on the 
interests o f their corresponding level of governments instead o f on the interests o f the 
business group. Furthermore, former state-owned enterprises are often under softer
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budget constraints than other business groups. As such, managers would not have 
much incentive to utilize resources efficiently and engage in capability building 
corporate entrepreneurial activities. Therefore, they are lacking the entrepreneurial 
mindset to pursue corporate entrepreneurial intensive strategies.
In conclusion, the pre-reform way of doing things is deeply embedded in the 
member firms via the effects o f founding and government influence on the selection 
of CEO and board of directors. As a result, the administrative heritage in member 
firms will have a negative impact on corporate entrepreneurial tendencies.
Hypothesis 2: Government influence via the selection of CEO and board 
members is negatively related to the corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity of member firms in a business group.
Ownership Heritage
Another type of government heritage that remains in the member firms of 
business groups is ownership heritage. Ownership heritage refers to the heritage 
effects resulting from having ownership stakes in a firm. In a transition economy 
where there is a lack o f market for property rights, it is difficult to diversify 
ownership when former state-owned enterprises are transferred into member firms in 
a business group. Government still retains their ownership stakes in the firms because 
there is little infusion of new capital. Although some argue that government 
ownership can be a more effective than private ownership in achieving government 
goals when a contract is incomplete (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Che & Qian, 1998), 
Jefferson (1998: 430) suggests that “in the absence of a well-defined property rights
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market, privatization may result in the transfer o f public assets to private owners who 
do not use them in a substantially more efficient way than they had been used under 
state ownership”.
From the institutional economics perspective, government ownership is more 
efficient than private ownership during economic transition where the markets have 
not been fully developed. First, government-owned enterprises are favored in credit 
rationing by the government when the capital market is still imperfect (Che & Qian, 
1998). Second, government-owned enterprises are vehicles for local governments to 
cash in the value of land under their control in the absence o f asset markets 
(Naughton, 1994). Third, government-owned enterprises can use their connections 
with the government to smooth transactions when the product market is undeveloped 
(Nee, 1992). Lastly, government-owned enterprises are under better protection in the 
absence of secure property rights (Che & Qian, 1998; Li, 1996). In consequence, 
government ownership stakes are usually retained in the transformed state-owned 
enterprises for both political and economic reasons.
However, ownership heritage in the member firms of business groups will 
inhibit the entrepreneurial growth of the firms. Jefferson (1998) argued that the 
properties of non-excludability and non-diminishability o f a public good (Comes & 
Sandler, 1986), inherent in state-owned enterprises, create externalities that will 
impair the efficiency o f the economy. This is because govemment-owned enterprises 
are subject to the opportunistic behaviors of employees, managers, and government 
officials in the absence of an effective monitoring system (Jefferson, 1998). This 
results in overconsumption, in which everyone is extracting value from the firm in
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excess of what he or she puts in. For instance, government treats the state-owned 
enterprises as “cash cows” for financing public infrastructure and social welfare. 
Government as an owner is less profit-driven, and hence, is less vigilant in its 
monitoring role. For the economy as a whole, resources are diverted and efficiency is 
impaired. With government ownership retained in the member firms o f business 
groups, such efficiency problems have not been solved since the Economic Reform 
(Jefferson, 1998).
Past literature has found a negative relationship between government 
ownership and market-to-book value, an indicator of shareholder value and firm 
growth (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). One explanation is that government tends to 
place more emphasis on nonprofit goals such as the provisions of social welfare and 
employment opportunities, and is willing to tradeoff these goals against shareholder 
value and profit maximization (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995). Empirical 
evidence did support the positive relationship between government ownership in local 
enterprises and level o f employment in the corresponding government jurisdiction 
(Che & Qian, 1998). Also, in a study of privatized firms across 15 countries, Andrews 
and Dowling (1998) found that post-privatization gains did not materialize for firms 
where government held significant shares after the privatization process. This further 
reinforces the notion that government is inefficient in monitoring performance 
outcomes associated with their investments and government’s ownership stakes will 
not facilitate the long-term entrepreneurial growth o f firms.
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Hypothesis 3: Inherited government influence via government ownership is 
negatively related to the corporate entrepreneurial intensity of 
member firms in a business group.
Emerging new formal institutions
Government reform policy
With the old formal institutions phasing out gradually, the new formal 
institutions emerge. New formal institutions are being introduced into the transition 
economy of China since the inauguration of the Economic Reform in 1979. 
Government has introduced large-scale reform policy that exerts positive influence on 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity in the transition period, moving towards a market- 
based economy.
One of the major principles of the Economic Reform is regional 
decentralization. Through regional decentralization, fiscal incentives were given to 
local governments for more local economic development. The formal budgetary 
revenue system, the “unified revenue collection and unified spending” system, was 
replaced by the “fiscal contracting system” (Qian, 2000). Under this new fiscal 
policy, each level of the government turns over a contractually specified amount of 
the tax revenues collected from enterprise under its jurisdiction to the next higher 
level of government and can keep the residual. Such contracts allow the local 
governments to retain all the local revenues, thus becoming the residual claimants in 
the flow of tax revenues. In addition, local governments are granted “extra-budgetary 
funds” and “off-budget funds” for local economic development.
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Research has found that fiscal incentives are associated with faster 
development of non-state enterprises and more reform in state-owned enterprises (Jin, 
Qian, & Weingast, 1999). As such, the fiscal contracting system has provided local 
governments with a market-oriented incentive to foster economic growth. At the same 
time, local governments are more exposed to market institutions and market 
competition (Nee, 1992) and they act as “market-oriented agents” who compete 
fiercely on regional, national, and international product markets (Walder, 1995). 
Hence, to enhance the strategic competitiveness of firms in the domestic inter­
regional competition and international market, local governments are motivated to 
facilitate entrepreneurial growth of firms under their jurisdictions.
In particular, a clear strategic mission laid out in the Economic Reform is that 
diversified business groups are seen as a means of achieving broad-based sustainable 
economic development and growth (Keister, 2000). Specific goals that were set for 
business groups to accomplish included: cost efficiency through economies of scale, 
better coordination of management of individual enterprises, decrease in the reliance 
of firms on the state to cover operating deficits, improved firm performance, 
increased total output, improved research and development in order to decrease 
reliance on foreign technology, enhanced international competitiveness, and reduced 
protection of firms from competition (Li, 1995). To facilitate the achievement of 
these goals, governments at all levels have formulated different policies to provide 
incentives for the development o f diversified business groups in their jurisdictions. 
For instance, the Shanghai government gave preferential treatments to business 
groups and their member firms. Such treatments include tax refunds, preferential
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permission for company listings in the stock market, relocation of excess employees, 
and provision of loans (China Economic Yearbook, 1998). These government policies 
helped Shanghai to maintain an economic growth rate o f 2 to 3 percent higher than 
the national economic growth rate in the last five years (China Economic Yearbook,
1998). As such, the government is determined to foster long-term, entrepreneurial 
growth o f member firms in diversified business groups.
With the preferential treatments through government reform policies, member 
firms gain access to the resource endowments from the corresponding government 
jurisdiction in addition to the business group’s resource endowments. As a result, they 
end up accumulating substantial slack resources. Organization theory suggests that 
the purpose of slack is to allow firms to forgo short-term gains in favor o f long-term 
outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963; Sharfinan, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988). 
Consequently, corporate entrepreneurial intensity is enhanced.
In all, to fulfill the strategic mission of the Economic Reform, sustain their 
competitiveness and growth in the long run, and with the backup o f abundant 
resources, firms under the emerging government reform policy are more concerned 
about building firm-specific capabilities. As such, firms are more inclined to pursue 
corporate entrepreneurial activities under the influence of the reform-oriented 
government policies.
Hypothesis 4 : Government influence via reform policy is positively related to the 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity of member firms in a 
business group.
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II. Informai Institutions and Economie Growth:
Control Mechanisms and Corporate Entrepreneurial Intensity of Member firms
in a Diversified Business Group
Informal institutions, embodied in the customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct, play an important role in regulating economic exchange shape the behaviors 
of firms and individuals during transition when formal institutions are being 
weakened and reestablished (North, 1990). During institutional transitions, diversified 
business groups with these informal institution elements fill the institutional voids 
and facilitate firms’ entrepreneurial growth in emerging economies (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b; Leff, 1978). From this perspective, entrepreneurship is a context- 
dependent process through which firms create wealth by building a unique portfolio 
of resources to exploit marketplace opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton,
2000). This indicates that gaining access to a variety of resources and knowing how 
to leverage them creatively are two core actions for the entrepreneurial growth of a 
firm. However, in a transition economy like China, the lack o f an adequate legal 
framework and a stable political structure has resulted in the underdevelopment of 
strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986), which leads to difficulties for creating the 
resources need by firms to conduct economic activity. Diversified business groups 
emerge as the substitutes for the strategic factor markets and become the seedbed for 
corporate entrepreneurship in transition economies. In the following, I will discuss 
how the different types o f control mechanisms of a diversified business group 
facilitate incentives for entrepreneurial growth of their member firms in the transition 
economy of China.
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Business Group’s Control Mechanisms
Diversified business groups are analogous to multidivisional structures with 
the parent firm as the head office and member firms as semi-autonomous divisional 
units. In the product diversification and associate organizational control literature, 
two main types o f control mechanisms are mentioned (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). The first type is strategic control which refers to the use of 
long-term, strategically relevant, subjective and sometimes intuitive criteria for the 
evaluation o f subsidiary managers’ performance (Gupta, 1987; Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1988). As such, strategic controls require substantial information exchange between 
headquarters and divisions, and knowledge about each business operation. It is also 
proposed that strategic control mechanisms are best in realizing synergistic 
economies that arise from the benefits o f sharing resources (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987). 
The second type is financial control that entails objective criteria such as return on 
investment in the evaluation of subsidiary managers’ performance (Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1988). Financial control mechanisms are best in realizing financial economies that 
result from risk pooling (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987).
In additional to strategic controls and financial controls, organizational culture 
can also be used as a mechanism to shape mangers’ behaviors. This type of control is 
known as clan control (Ouchi, 1980) or cultural control in this study. The use of 
cultural control is prevalent in the business group context as well as the collectivistic 
Chinese national context. The use of different types of control mechanisms is 
expected to generate different types o f economies that facilitate incentives for 
corporate entrepreneurial growth o f member firms in a diversified business group.
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Cultural Controls
A typical control mechanism used in firms in transition economies is cultural 
control. According to Ouchi (1980), bureaucracies are more efficient than relying on 
market transactions when markets fail. However, bureaucracies can fail when the 
ambiguity of performance evaluation becomes significantly greater than that which 
brings about market failures. In this situation, cultural controls emphasizing common 
values and beliefs come into play, and bureaucracies can increase a sense of 
affiliation with the firm and enhance goal congruence. Business groups are 
characterized by high levels o f performance ambiguity, as member firms contribute to 
the groups differently, and high level of goal congruence, as both the parents and 
member firms aim to maximize the group’s benefits. As such, cultural controls fit the 
context o f business groups and it is the least costly governance mechanism in shaping 
member firm behaviors from the parent firm’s perspective.
From the member firms’ perspective, they will be shaped to maximize 
cooperative opportunities for the group’s benefits as a whole on the up side and 
minimize opportunistic behaviors on the downside when they are governed by 
cultural controls. Most importantly, cultural control is a mechanism that helps realize 
the benefits of social capital to the fullest, which is crucial for economic transactions 
in transition economies. Social capital refers to the intangible relational resources that 
support the success of economic transactions in a society (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 
1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993). It is embedded in interpersonal 
relationships, authority relations, and consensual allocations of rights that establish
66
norms (Coleman, 1990). Trust and cooperative norms are the primary manifestations 
o f social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993).
Social capital is crucial for member firms’ corporate entrepreneurial growth. 
First, member firms face a liability of newness and lack of legitimacy in the sense that 
there is no heritage o f social capital in the form of interpersonal or interorganizational 
trust that provide strong historical institutional linkages between them and the 
stakeholders including government, financial institutions, suppliers, and customers. 
Member firms can overcome this liability by joining a business group as they can be 
sheltered under the umbrella of a parent firm that already possesses prestige and 
legitimacy in society. In particular, a business group can be viewed as a club in which 
members have access to and utilize the group’s resources, similar to club goods, at no 
additional cost once they join the group (Comes & Sandler, 1986). In this vein, social 
capital is created as a by-product of a business group (Olson, 1965) and provides 
efficient access to and utilization of other economic resources (Granovetter, 1995; 
Putnam, 1993).
Second, the three components of social capital - obligations and trust, 
information channels, and norms and effective sanctions (Coleman, 1988) - can help 
facilitate corporate entrepreneurial growth (Chung & Gibbons, 1997). Obligation and 
trust are informal institutions that substitute for the formal institutions such as 
property rights and ownership rights, which are not adequately developed, in 
transition economies. Thus, they can reduce ambiguity and enhance knowledge 
creation and diffusion among group members. Also, the trusting relationships 
established and maintained among member firms can reduce ambiguity and enhance
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knowledge creation and diffusion in the business group. This can facilitate individual 
member’s pursuit of internal innovations. Information channels, such as director 
interlocks, allow information about technological advances (Keister, 1998), market 
opportunities and collusive information among competitors (Haunschild, 1993), 
innovative strategies (Powell, 1990), and so on, to pass among member firms in the 
group. As such, knowledge creation is facilitated and corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity is enhanced. Finally, norms and sanctions effectively mitigate the risks of 
opportunistic behavior and foster a sense o f cooperation, which is conducive to 
entrepreneurial experimentation. All member firms abide by the norms produced by 
cultural controls. As such, member firms are expected to maintain good reputations, 
develop trusting relationships with other members, participate in social activities, and 
support other member firms even at the sacrifice of one’s own benefits. In 
consequence, cultural control is an effective governance mechanism in fostering 
entrepreneurial growth of member firms in a diversified business group.
Empirical findings support the notion that networks o f social interactions 
created by entrepreneurs feed on their own successes in emerging economies (Neace,
1999). In another study, it is found that communities and societies with high levels of 
social capital and trust are much more likely to be open, fluid, creative, effective, and 
efficient in economic community endeavor (Putnam, 1995). Hence, the cultural 
control mechanism implemented in a business group will help member firms realize 
the economies of social capital that are crucial for corporate entrepreneurial growth.
Based on the above arguments and empirical support, social capital realized 
by implementing cultural controls not only prevents the downside costs and risks of
68
conducting corporate entrepreneurial activities by substituting the external capital 
markets and mitigating opportunistic behaviors o f member firms. At the same time, 
cultural controls increases the upside gains o f social capital for member firms to 
engage in corporate entrepreneurial activities by cultivating a norm of 
cooperativeness and trust.
Hypothesis 5: A cultural control emphasis among member firms in a business 
group is positively related to member firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity.
Strategic Controls
The primary reason for group membership is the scope economies provided 
by a diversified business group in China (Keister, 1998). Strategic controls aim at 
maximizing the scope economies for member firms in a business group. Two factors 
are emphasized when implementing strategic controls: knowledge sharing and long­
term orientation. Both factors are crucial for achieving sustainable competitive 
advantages for the member firms and the business group.
Information or knowledge sharing is necessary for corporate entrepreneurial 
growth. In the absence o f well-functioned factor market and product market in the 
transition economies, it would be more costly to acquire information in the market 
than in the hierarchy. Diversified business groups entail an internal market for 
knowledge sharing. A typical knowledge sharing mechanism in diversified business 
groups is interlocking directorates. Through interlocking directorates, member firms
69
can get new information about technological innovations, management know-how, 
and even supply information. Keister (1998) found that interlocking directorates are 
positively related to firm performance and productivity. The more extensive the 
interlocks, the better will be firm performance and productivity. Strategic controls 
emphasize the exchange o f information and knowledge within the business groups, 
and so, corporate entrepreneurial activities such as product innovations and research 
and development will be facilitated.
Second, strategic controls encourage a more long-term strategic managerial 
mindset. Compared to the developed countries, the labor mobility in China is minimal 
because job allocations are often assigned by government agencies. When member 
firms are partially or fully privatized by the state-owned enterprises in the Chinese 
business groups, managers likely lack an entrepreneurial strategic mind-set. Business 
groups act as a vehicle for mobilizing human capital and provide an internal labor 
market for accumulating human resources for strategic entrepreneurship. Following 
the model o f Japanese keiretsus and Korean chaebols, education institutes are set up 
in most business groups to provide advanced training and education for employees of 
member firms (Keister, 1998). More importantly, top managers in business groups are 
aggressive “empire builders” who have large propensity for group expansionism. 
(Leff, 1978). Because o f the deficiencies o f formal capital market in the transition 
economies, managers lack objective financial criteria for evaluating their 
performance. Instead, they are evaluated by subjective means such as self-assessment 
or comparison with rival groups (Leff, 1978). As such, the use o f subjective strategic
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controls shift top managers to become more risk-taking and proactive, and motivates 
managers to engage in more entrepreneurial activities.
By implementing strategic controls, managers are motivated to focus on long­
term firm performance. Use of strategic controls can help establish a norm of risk 
sharing among member firms in a business group (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987). In this 
way, firms are more willing to undertake risky projects as they are evaluated on 
commitment to strategic goals rather than financial outcomes. So, strategic controls 
can enhance managerial commitment to iimovations (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 
1990). The emphasis on building firms’ capabilities through long-term 
entrepreneurial growth is particularly important to enhance the strategic 
competitiveness o f firms in the transition economies in the global arena.
Hypothesis 6; A strategic control emphasis among member firms in a business 
group is positively related to member firm ’s corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity.
Financial Controls
Financial controls mechanisms can provide financial economies, thus 
facilitating corporate entrepreneurial activities, for member firms in a business group. 
There are severe constraints in the capital markets o f a transition economy. In the 
transition economy of China, liberalization creates the opportimities for market 
exchange, but within a context where there is no established history o f adjudicating 
contract law or system to monitor and enforce the fulfillment o f market contracts.
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Although liberalization creates the opportunities for investment in private firms, it 
does so within a context where there is no established bankruptcy procedures 
designed to mediate between multiple stakeholders in the case of failure. 
Furthermore, market change creates the opportunities for more effective corporate 
governance by private actors and the market, but within a context with no established 
accounting or auditing mechanisms to provide credible information to new owners as 
well as no effective board of director system to monitor managers (Hoskisson, et al. 
2000; Spicer, et al., 2000). Together with government control of the overall banking 
sector and significant restrictions on foreign and private banks to operate, China’s 
capital market remains rudimentary (Keister, 1998).
Facing all these constraints, business groups substitute for more developed 
financial markets and allow member firms to obtain otherwise scare financial 
resources. In general, a business group provides three sources of financial capital to 
its members. First, the multidivisional structure of a business group provides an 
internal capital market emphasizing financial economies where redistribution of 
financial capital to the highest return uses within the group is likely (Hill & 
Hoskisson, 1987). Also, insider lending among members within a business group 
substitute for the formal capital market so that firms can get access to otherwise 
scarce capital where markets are inadequate at allocating funds (Goto, 1982).
Second, members can get access to additional financing through the group’s 
finance company, a specialized firm that collects and redistributes funds within the 
group as well as obtains funds through state banks and external sources on behalf of 
member firms (Keister, 1998). Besides providing loans to member firms for growth
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and expansion, the finance companies also enable firms to meet production, research 
and development, and marketing needs that might have gone unmet without access to 
capital (Li, 1995). By the mid-1990s, all of the largest business groups in China had 
group finance companies (Keister, 2000).
Third, business groups acts as an as an agent for the group to attract inward 
foreign investment (Guillen, 2000). By joining the group, members can get access to 
international capital markets. In all, business groups in China have fulfilled the most 
pressing need for their member firms: the need for credit. Especially in the transition 
economy of China where most of the firms in the business groups are state-owned 
enterprises before the reform, the conversion of state-owned enterprises into market- 
oriented firms (Nee, 1992) can be regarded as a privatization buyout which can be an 
attraction to receive government subsidy for R&D expenditures to foster 
entrepreneurial pursuits and strategic innovations (Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, & 
Zhukov, 1999; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000).
Past literature suggests that an emphasis on financial controls may reduce 
long-term investments (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). However, such 
findings may not be applicable in the context of transition economies where it is very 
costly to attain financial resources in the market and the labor market does not allow 
labor mobility. The redistributive effects of financial economies realized in a business 
group provides financial resources for corporate entrepreneurial growth to member 
firms who are unable to get access to financial resources in the external capital 
market. With limited mobility in the labor market, the short-term opportunistic 
behavior due to financial controls will be minimized. In fact, financial controls may
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provide incentives for managers to improve production efficiency, which requires 
investments in corporate entrepreneurship. Hence, it is expected that financial 
controls may enhance corporate entrepreneurial intensity o f member firms in a 
diversified business group.
Hypothesis 7; A financial control emphasis among member firms in a business 
group is positively related to member fîrm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity.
In summary, during institutional transition, member firms in a business group 
are under dual influence from both formal and informal institutions. For formal 
institutions, it is predicted that administrative heritage effects via firm founding and 
the selection of CEO and board members are negatively related to firm corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity. Another heritage effect from the pre-reform government is 
government ownership, which is also hypothesized to have negative effects on firm 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity. On the contrary, the reform policy carried out 
during the institutional transition period is hypothesized to have positive with firm 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity. As for informal institutions, the three types of 
business group control mechanisms -  cultural, strategic, and financial controls - are 
hypothesized to positively influence corporate entrepreneurial intensity. The next 
section will describe the research methodology for testing the above-mentioned 
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODS
Sample
The characteristics and functions of diversified business groups are closely 
linked to the historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural factors o f their 
economies. Furthermore, there is path dependence between business groups and their 
institutional environment, whereby the development o f diversified business groups 
depends greatly on, and will influence the evolution of, existing institutions in the 
economy. As a consequence, it is extremely difficult to conduct comparative and 
cross-national studies without examining the dynamics, timing, and country-specific 
effects o f institutional change.
Also, sampling and data collection can pose problems to empirical studies on 
groups, especially those in emerging economies as well. Most o f the studies are 
conducted on publicly traded companies due to the availability o f data sources. 
However, it is well observed that most business groups have a large number of 
unlisted firms (Khanna, 2000), thereby, making it difficult to obtain a representative 
sample. Another problem is that the listing criteria and accounting reporting standards 
may either be unavailable or inconsistent across different government levels within a 
country as well as across different emerging economies, resulting in differences in 
time and levels (Hoskisson, et al., 2000). As such, the availability and comparability 
o f data sources may limit the feasibility of conducting comparative studies of 
diversified business groups.
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Furthermore, the operationalization o f performance measures is controversial 
in studies on emerging economies. Recent studies point out that performance 
measures, such as the stock performance, are differentially informative across 
countries (Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 1999). Such differences may confound findings in 
cross-country research on business groups. Besides, researchers also challenge the 
validity o f the performance measures. The problem is further complicated by 
differences in financial reporting systems, the lack o f systematic reporting systems 
due to reforms, and the incentives for private firms to hide profits, which contribute to 
validity and reliability problems o f the performance measures used in studies on 
emerging economies (Hoskisson, et al., 2000).
In addition, there is lack of common definition of group membership in the 
business groups literature. Most of the prior studies have glossed over the 
fundamental question of what delineates group boundaries, and yet, the definition of 
business groups rests heavily on the perception of local observers (Khanna & Rivkin,
2000). As such, the lack of common definition of group membership makes multiple- 
country studies difficult.
In conclusion, the empirical issues mentioned above imply that cross-country 
comparative findings will be confounded by the country-specific institutional factors 
that are changing at a volatile pace, data availability and data comparability due to the 
idiosyncratic accounting and reporting practices of each country, and the absence of 
common business group definition. Accordingly, the focus on single coimtry appears 
to be a sensible first step to understanding the more general issue of the business 
group’s nature worldwide (Khanna & Rivkin, 2000).
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In this study, China was chosen as the empirical setting. The definition of 
business groups rest on both the Chinese government officials (the National Statistics 
Bureau) and the respondents’ perceptions. There are 2,400 business groups in China 
(China’s Yearly Review, 2000). The sample of this study is the largest 250 business 
groups in China and their five largest member firms. These firms are selected in the 
sample because they allow a stronger test of the theory proposed in this study. First, 
the largest 250 business groups are likely to have inherited and reforming government 
influence; and second, the size of the business group are likely to have strong internal 
control mechanisms, thus allowing the test of the effects of group’s control 
mechanisms on members firms.
The level o f analysis of this study is the member firm level. We received a 
total o f 1,172 questionnaires from the member firms. After cases with missing 
information are deleted, the final sample size is 992. The sample consists of firms 
covering 29 states and 6 major industrial sectors (agriculture, industries, architecture, 
transportation and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing, and property and real 
estates) in China. Among the 250 business groups, 148 of them have 10,000 
employees or more.
Data Collection
The data of this dissertation was employed from the China’s Business Group 
research project that was sponsored by the Research Grants Council of the Hong 
Kong Government (Project no.: CUHK4092/98H). The data was collected with the 
help o f the China’s National Statistic Bureau. To ensure the quality and reliability of
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the data, several procedures were taken. First, two surveys were developed, one 
archival and one perceptual. Both archival and perceptual survey data were collected 
at both the business group and member firms levels to allow cross-validation of 
information, especially when there is no extensive published data in emerging 
economies such as China. The archival survey data concerns mainly firm accotmting 
and financial information. They were reported by the chief accountants o f the firms in 
the sample. The perceptual survey data concerns more about strategic and control 
information and they were filled by the top managers in the sample firms. The use of 
both archival and survey data solved the problem of common method variance.
Second, several actions were taken in administering the questionnaires. First, 
questionnaires were sent to the largest five member firms of each business group. The 
use of multiple informants allows the triangulation o f information as well as the 
reduction of respondent’s bias. Following James, Demaree and Wolf (1984), 
interrater agreements on the three business group control mechanism scales were 
calculated. James et al. (1984) developed the within-group similarity or agreement 
coefficient, rwo, to assess interrater reliability among the judgments made by a single 
group of judges or respondents (e.g. member firms within a business group) on a 
single variable (e.g. strategic controls) about a single referent (e.g. the parent firm in a 
business group). The rwo formula for ratings of a single target on a multi-item scale 
is defined as the following,
J ( 1 -  S x /  /  c t 'e u )
tW G (J) —
J (1- Sx/ /  C T "eu ) +  Sxj^  /  O ^E U
Where:
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rwG = within-group agreement coefficient for respondents’ mean scores based 
on J items
Sxj“ = mean o f the observed variances on the J items
cr'EU = expected variance of a hypothesized null distribution
The results showed that the median rwo for cultural controls, strategic 
controls, and financial controls, are 0.74, 0.77, and 0.86, respectively. The median 
values were reported as they can reflect the distribution of coefficients more 
accurately (Jones, Johnson, Butler, & Main, 1983). A rule o f thumb has been 
advanced by James and his colleagues such that values of rwo above 0.7 are 
indicative of satisfactory agreement within respondents (James, et al., 1984). As such, 
the three group control mechanism scales achieve satisfactory interrater agreement.
Also, the questionnaires were translated and back translated to eliminate 
measurement errors due to language differences. Finally, a pilot study, in which 
questionnaires were tested by a group of Chinese managers, was conducted before 
launching the large-scale distribution of the survey.
Third, non-response bias was minimal, as there was a 91 % response rate. This 
was facilitated by the use o f government agency, the China’s National Statistics 
Bureau’s that is comparable to the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 
United States, to audit the data collection process. The National Statistics Bureau was 
in charge of distributing and collecting the archival and survey data. The Statistics 
Bureau officials also gave follow-up phone calls to validate the information reported
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by the sample firm managers. This helps ensure the accuracy of information from the 
respondents.
Finally, to capture the transitional nature o f the settings in this study, data 
were collected in 1998 and managers were asked to provide financial data over the 
period of 1996 to 1998. First, the second phrase of China’s Economic Reform started 
in 1994 in which the old institutions were gradually phrased out and new institutions 
were introduced to replace the old institutions (Qian, 2000). Second, the year of 1996 
is the year when most o f the business groups were formed (China’s Yearly Review, 
1997). Third, the data collection period should allow enough time for the lagged 
effects on the dependent variable, corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Therefore, the 
time frame of the study should be able to measure the effects as predicted in the 
theoretical framework.
Measures
Dependent Variable
Corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Past research suggests two main 
dimensions o f corporate entrepreneurship: innovation and strategic renewal (Guth & 
Ginsberg, 1990). Irmovation refers to the firm’s commitment to creating and 
introducing new products, production processes, and organizational systems (Covin 
& Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Strategic renewal refers to revitalizing the 
firm’s operations and building or acquiring capabilities (Zahra, 1993, 1996). In 
transition economies where the product and technological markets are still 
underdeveloped (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), both innovation and strategic renewal are
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especially referred to as internal capabilities building including product capabilities 
building, technological capabilities building, and marketing capabilities building. To 
capture these three types o f capabilities building, this study measures corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity by four items: (I) Research and development expenditures, 
(2) Number o f new products introduced to markets, (3) Plant and equipment 
investment, and (4) Marketing and distribution expenditures. They are measured by a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from I (Decreased) to 7 (Increased) over the past three 
years (1996-1998) in the perceptual survey. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.81. 
Independent Variables 
Government Influence
Administrative heritage is subdivided into two constructs:
Firm  founding. This is a dummy variable such that a value of 1 indicates the 
member firm was founded in accord with government declaration. This measure is 
from the archival survey.
CEO and board member selection. This is measured by the average of two 
items: government influence over the selection o f CEO in the member firms, and 
government influence over the selection of board o f directors in member firms. Both 
items are measured by 7-point response scales (1-little influence, 7-great influence) in 
the perceptual survey. The inter-item correlation between CEO selection and board 
member selection is 0.68.
State ownership. This is a proxy for ownership heritage and is defined by the 
percentage of shares owned by various state governing bodies in the member firms of 
the business groups. This is taken from the archival survey.
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Government reform policy. This is measured by a 7-point response scale (I- 
little influence, 7-great influence) which asks to what extent the reforming 
government influence member firms via government policies including: (I) Industrial 
policy, (2) Taxation policy, (3) Policy to promote sales growth, and (4) Economic 
growth strategy policy. This is from the perceptual survey and the Cronbach’s alpha 
of this scale is 0.88.
Business Group's Control Mechanisms
The three business group’s control scales are all measured at the member firm 
level. They are perceptual measures o f the member firm managers on the control 
mechanisms implemented by the parent firm in their respective business groups.
Cultural Controls. The cultural control factor is measured by a newly 
developed scale that is composed of 6 items on a 7-point response scale (1-Little 
extent, 7-Large extent) in the perceptual survey. These items measure the extent to 
which group executives evaluate member firms’ performance through the use of 
group’s culture. The six items include: (1) maintain the member firm’s reputation 
within the group, (2) comply with a strong group culture, (3) maintain trusting 
relationships within the group, (4) maintain cordial relationships with other managers 
in the group, (5) participate in social activities with other mangers from member firms 
and businesses, (6) support each other, even to sacrifice one’s unit benefits and to 
support other units to achieve the goal. The Cronbach’s alpha for cultural controls is 
0.83.
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Strategic Controls. Strategic controls is measured by four items on a 7-point 
response scale in the perceptual survey that indicates the extent to which the group 
executives exercise strategic controls to evaluate the performance o f the member 
firms. The strategic control scale is adapted from a previous well-established scale by 
Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1992). It consist o f the following items: the extent to which 
the group parents (I) understand the industry in which the member firm competes, (2) 
understand the strategy of the member firm, (3) understand the strategy of the 
principal competitors o f the member firm, and (4) jointly develop strategic initiatives 
with the member firm. The Cronbach’s alpha for strategic controls is 0.88.
Financial Controls. The financial control factor is composed of four items on 
a 7-point response scale in the perceptual survey. The scales indicates the importance 
of financial measures and procedures group executives used in evaluating the member 
firms’ performance. The financial control scale is adapted from a previous well- 
established scale from Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1992). It consists of the following 
items: the extent to which affiliate firm is evaluated based on: (1) Return on assets, 
(2) Profit, (3) Sales, and (4) Sales growth. The Cronbach’s alpha for financial controls 
is 0.83.
Control Variables
Variables which are found to have influence on the dependent variable, 
corporate entrepreneurial intensity, in the past literature are added in the model as 
control variables. The control variables are both at the member firm level, business 
group level, and industry level.
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Member firm  level
Firm  size. Firm size has been shown to influence R&D expenditures 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989) and new product introductions (Chaney & Devinney,
1992). Firm size was calculated by using the logarithm o f the number o f employees.
Firm  performance relative to principal competitors. Similar to firm size, 
firm performance is also shown to influence R&D expenditures and new product 
introductions (Chaney & Devirmey, 1992). Thus the effect o f firm performance was 
controlled in this study. In addition, the performance measure is a relative measure 
from the perceptual survey. That is, the respondents were asked how they perceive 
their firms’ performance relative to the competitors in the industry. In this way, 
industry effects were also controlled. Three performance indicators were used: return 
on assets relative to the principal competitors, return on sales relative to the principal 
competitors, and return on equity relative to the principal competitors. Respondents 
are asked to indicate on a 7-point response scale how the three performance indicators 
changed in the past three years ( 1-decreased, 7-increased). The Cronbach’s alpha of 
the firm performance scales is 0.97.
Current ratio. Current ratio, as a measure o f firm liquidity, has been found to 
influence the amount of funds available for corporate entrepreneurial activities 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). It is measured by current assets divided by current 
liabilities. This is a three-year average from 1996 to 1998 and is taken from the 
archival survey.
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Business group level
Group’s product diversification. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, 
the business group is a resource base for its member firms. Accordingly, the more 
diversified the business group, the more diverse are the resources for member firms’ 
entrepreneurial activities. Past literature has found that product diversification had 
influence on both R&D expenditures and new product introductions (Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). To measure the level of product 
diversification, the entropy measure was adopted (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 
1985). The entropy measure formula is:
Entropy measure = SPj x In(l/Pj)
Where
Pj = the percentage of firm sales in segment j
In(l/Pj) = weight for each segments j
The entropy measure takes into accoimt the number, and the relative 
importance, of each segment within a business group. The entropy measure has also 
been found to have good construct validity relative to other measures of 
diversification such as SIC count measures (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Moesel,
1993). The entropy measure is from the archival survey.
Group’s geographic dispersion. Due to the less developed transport and 
communications infrastructure as well as regional protectionism in China, member 
firms may face geographic barriers in coordinating corporate entrepreneurial activates 
when they are geographically distant from each other. Therefore, group’s geographic 
dispersion is expected to have negative influence on firm’s corporate entrepreneurial
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intensity. Geographic dispersion is measured by a two-digit geographic code count in 
the archival survey. Since some business groups have less than five member firms 
reported in the survey, the two-digit area code count is divided by the number of 
member firms in each business group. In general, a higher value o f the measure 
indicates greater geographic dispersion of the business group.
G roup’s performance. Group performance is expected to have a positive 
effect on member firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Group performance is 
proxied by group’s return on sales and is measured by a 7-point response scale (1- 
decreased, 7-increased) over the period from 1996 to 1998 in the perceptual survey.
Table 2 summarizes the measures, data sources, and reliabilities (Cronbach’s 
Alpha) of the variables used in this study.
Insert Table 2 about here
Confirm atory Factor Analysis
To further explore the internal structure of the scales and the validity of the 
measures mentioned above, confirmatory factor analysis was conducted. Table 3 
summarizes the results of the confirmatory factor analysis. The results showed that all 
the observed variables were loaded on their respective latent variables with factor 
loadings exceeding 0.48. The rule of thumb for factor loadings higher than 0.40 is 
routinely used in the social sciences (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986). As such, there 
is adequate unidimensionality of the constructs. To test for the convergent and 
discriminant validities of the constructs, composite reliabilities and average variance
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extracted are calculated following the equations formulated by Fomell and Larcker 
(1981). The composite reliability is computed as follows:
(Z V '
P n = ------
(Z lyi)^+ZVar(Eyi)
And, the average variance extracted is computed as follows:
P V C ( T l )  ~
Z + Z Var (Syi)
Where
I'y = Standardized factor loading o f  item y
Var (Gy) = error variance of item y
The composite reliability, p,,, indicates the convergence reliability o f each 
measure in a single factor. In this study, the composite reliabilities o f all constructs 
are close to or exceed 0.70, thus achieving satisfactory convergent validity. The 
average variance extracted, pvc(n). indicates the discriminant validity of the construct 
as it measures the amount of variance that is captured by the construct in relation to 
the amount of variance due to measurement error. In this study, the average variance 
extracted of all the constructs is close to, or greater than, the rule o f thumb of 0.50 
(Fomell & Larcker, 1981). This indicates that the variances captured by the items in 
each of the constructs are more than the variances due to measurement error, thus 
achieving satisfactory discriminant validities o f the constructs. As such, both the 
convergent and discriminant validities o f the constructs are confirmed in this study.
The confirmatory factor analysis also indicates that the overall measurement 
model is performing well. This is supported by the model fit indices that determines
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to what extent the model fits the sample data. The common model fit criteria used are 
chi-square (%^ ), goodness of fit index (GFI), comparative fit index (CFI), root-mean- 
square error o f approximation (RMSEA), and standardized root-mean-square residual 
(RMR) (Bentier, 1989; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1996). A value of 0.90 and above of the 
fit indices and a value of less than 0.05 of RMSEA and RMR indicate a good model 
fit. The chi-square statistics is 1306.36 (df=273, p=0.001). The goodness of fit 
measures in Table 4 reflects the measurement model is o f  adequate fit. Both of the 
GFI and CFI are 0.91 and the RMSEA and RMR are 0.06 and 0.04 respectively.
In all, the confirmatory factor analysis supports adequate convergent and 
discriminant validities for each of the constructs. As such, the measures can be used 
in later statistical analysis in this study.
Insert Table 3 about here
Statistical Analysis Method
Hierarchical regression was used to test the individual hypotheses in this 
study. With this procedure, controlled variables were entered first, and then followed 
by the two sets of independent variables (government influence and group’s control 
mechanisms), and finally the interaction terms were entered. By inserting the sets of 
variables hierarchically in the regression model, we can account for the increments in 
the proportion of variance explained of the dependent variables due to the addition of 
each new set o f independent variables to those that are higher in the hierarchy (Cohen 
& Cohen, 1983). The use of hierarchical regression analysis is particularly helpful for
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examining how formal and informal institutions explain incremental variance relative 
to corporate entrepreneurial intensity o f member firms in a diversified business group.
The control variables were input in Model 1, and the main effects o f the 
government influence variables and business group controls variables are input in 
Model 2 and Models 3-5. Since the three types of group’s control mechanisms are 
correlated among each other at p<0.01 level, they are inserted hierarchically in the 
regression models. Models 2, which consist of the control variables and the main 
effect variables, are considered as the base models of the study.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The means, standard deviations, correlations and variance explained factors 
(VIF) of the variables are presented in Table 4. From the correlation results, there is 
no collinearity problem for all the independent variables, except for the correlations 
among the three group controls variables (cultural controls and strategic controls are 
correlated at 0.46, p<0.01; cultural controls and financial controls are correlated at 
0.39, p<O.Ol; and strategic and financial controls are correlated at 0.33, p<0.01). To 
solve the multicollinearity problem, the group control mechanism variables were 
inserted hierarchically in the regression models. Finally, the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) of the independent variables showed that collinearity did not pose a problem 
because the mean of all the VIFs is 1.07, which is not considerably larger than 1.0 
(Chatter]ee & Price, 1991).
Insert Table 4 about here
Results of Hypothesis Tests
The following presents the hierarchical regression analysis results. Overall, 
the control variables and independent variables together account for considerable 
variance explained of the dependent variable, corporate entrepreneurial intensity, with 
R* ranging from 0.27 to 0.29 (Models 3 to 5). The hierarchical regression also 
indicates significant incremental variance explained by both the government
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influence variables and the control mechanism variables. Model 2 shows that the 
inclusion of government influence variables account for an additional 10% variance 
explained ( R“=0.10, F statistics for change=3.24, p<0.001). In Model 3, Model 4, 
and Model 5, the inclusion of each of the group’s control mechanism variables 
account for 3% to 18% of the variance explained. It can be concluded that both 
government influence, as a formal institution, and control mechanisms of business 
group, as an informal institution, have significant effects on firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity in a transition economy. The findings o f each o f the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are reported next.
Insert Table 4 about here
Administrative Heritage
Hypothesis 1 predicts that government influence via firm founding will have a 
negative effect on firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity. In Model 2, firm 
founding is negatively related to corporate entrepreneurial intensity and such 
relationship is statistically significant (B—0.50, p<0.10). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 
received marginal support.
Hypothesis 2, which predicts a negative relationship between government 
influence via the selection of CEO and board members and corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity, is not supported. There is no statistically significant relationship between 
the two variables (B=-0.30, n.s.).
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Ownership Heritage
Hypothesis 3 also predicts a negative relationship between government 
ownership and corporate entrepreneurial intensity. As predicted, government 
ownership has a statically significant negative effect on corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity (6—0.07, p<0.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 received support.
Reform Policy
In contrast to the above three institutional legacy variables, it is predicted that 
government reform policy will have positive effect on firm’s corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity. The result in Model 2 o f Table 5 supports this prediction. 
Reform policy exhibits a statistically significant, positive relationship with corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity (6=0.02, p<0.10). Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 is marginally 
supported.
Group's Control Mechanisms
As for informal institutions, all the three types of group’s controls 
mechanisms are expected to exert positive effect on corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity. Hypothesis 5 receives strong support as the coefficient o f cultural controls, 
as shown in Model 3, is statistically significant at 0.001 level (6=0.10, p<0.001). In 
addition, comparing Model 3 to Model 2, there is a significant incremental effect of 
cultural controls on corporate entrepreneurial intensity ( R^=0.01, F statistics for 
change=13.63, p<0.001).
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Model 4 shows support for Hypothesis 6. Strategic controls is found to be 
positively related to corporate entrepreneurial intensity (0=0.05, p<0.10). Also, 
comparing Model 4 to Model 2, strategic controls has a significant effect on corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity ( R"=0.003, F statistics for change=3.35, p<0.10).
Financial controls exhibit a strong and positive relationship with corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity. In Model 5, the partial correlation coefficient of financial 
controls is 0.14 (0=0.14, p<0.00l), meaning that one standard deviation of an increase 
o f financial controls will lead to an increase of 14 standard deviations of corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity, given the values of all the other independent variables. 
Thus, Hypothesis 7 is strongly supported. Moreover, financial control exerts 
considerable incremental variance explained with an R square change o f 0.018 and an 
F statistics for change of 24.36 (p<0.001).
In summary, six out o f the seven hypotheses receive statistically significant 
support. This demonstrates that the empirical mode of the study contains strong main 
effects. As predicted, government influence via firm founding and ownership exert 
negative influence on corporate entrepreneurial intensity, while reform policy, 
together with the group’s cultural, strategic, and financial controls, are found to have 
positive effects.
Other Results - Control Variables
A total of six control variables are included in the statistical models to account 
for both the firm’s and group’s effects on corporate entrepreneurial intensity. 
Consistent with previous studies, firm size and relative firm performance exhibit
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strong and positive relationships with corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Other 
control variables are not statistically significant.
To conclude, the empirical findings reported in this chapter are in support of 
the theoretical arguments developed in this dissertation. Most of the main effects are 
supported, even after controlling for other strong predictors such as firm size and 
relative firm performance.
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter, empirical findings and implications of the study will be 
discussed and a research agenda for future research will be suggested. The 
dissertation ends with a final conclusion.
Discussion of Empirical Findings
The dissertation provides strong support for the general model as presented in 
Figure 4. In fact, six o f the seven hypotheses received support from the results of the 
study. These results suggest that corporate entrepreneurial activities in a transition 
economy are likely to be constrained by formal institutions inherited during firm 
founding and continuing through government ownership. However, such activities 
can be fostered by new institutions in both formal (e.g., government reform policies) 
as well as informal forms (e.g. business group’s control mechanisms).
Government Influence 
Administrative heritage
The findings show that inherited government influence via firm founding is 
negatively related to corporate entrepreneurial intensity. This provides strong 
implications for the fields of institutional theory and strategic management. First, firm 
founding reflects the embeddedness effects (Oliver, 1996) in the Chinese firm 
sample. There are two types of embeddedness effects. One is derived firom political 
embeddedness. Member firms founded by the government will maintain close 
political relationships. The other type is cognitive embeddedness. Administrative
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heritage influences managerial and organizational cognition (Eden & Spender, 1998). 
The founder’s (government) philosophy and the top management’s (previous 
government officials) ways of doing things will continue to influence organizational 
cognition o f the member firms in business groups. In the transition economy o f 
China, the inherited administrative heritage from the previous state-owned firms and 
government ministries will inhibit the entrepreneurial growth of member firms in a 
business group.
Second, the effect o f  firm founding highlights the importance of founding 
condition to a firm’s subsequent strategic decision and outcome. It is found that the 
innovativeness of a firm’s founding resources is positively related to its subsequent 
strategic actions such as building patent portfolio (Kelly & Rice, 2001). However, the 
formation o f business groups through government administrative means (such as the 
conversion of previous government agencies or industrial bureaus into business 
groups and the forced marriage of firms in the same regional jurisdictions by the local 
governments) may suggest a non-economic rationale for resource combinations. Such 
an administrative combination of member firms in a business group results in a heavy 
social and financial burden on the groups as well as making coordination among 
member firms difficult. Therefore, instead of relying on administrative means to 
combine firms’ resources in a business group, a market means should be encouraged. 
However, the lack of an efficient strategic factor markets (Leff, 1978) and the inter­
regional competition among local governments (Nee, 1992) have prevented effective 
mergers and acquisitions in China. This indicates a strong need for more market
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development and less government administrative intervention in firms in transition 
economies such as China.
Alternatively, no statistically significant relationship was found between CEO 
and board member selection and corporate entrepreneurial intensity. The lack of 
statistical significance may reflect first, the lack of managerial skills and knowledge 
with free market practices, and second, it may reflect an ineffective compensation 
system of top managers, or the underdeveloped board system in a transition economy.
The previous government officials may continue to run the firms as 
government ministries because they lack the skills, knowledge, experience, and 
mindset for managing firms in a market oriented environment. Also, the continued 
appointment of government officials in corporatized firms may lead to entrenchment 
problems, as studies have found that managers with longer tenures are more likely to 
initiate entrenchment efforts and adversely affect firm growth (Tosi, Katz, & Gomez- 
Mejia, 1997). Furthermore, there are still restrictions on the managerial compensation 
in China. For example, top executives’ compensation should not be exceeding a 
certain times of the average salary of the employees in the firm (China Industrial 
Report, 2001). Thus, top management may not have adequate incentives to align their 
interests with the firm’s interests.
There is also a concern about the effectiveness o f board systems in privatized 
firms in emerging economies. The continued government influence in the board of 
the firms through the appointment and selection of board members indicate that board 
membership is in proportion with ownership (Dharwadkar, George, & Grandes,
2000). As a result, new top management and new board membership is needed after
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administrative restructuring of business groups in China. Further exploration on top 
management and board structures may require future research efforts to fully explore 
this issue.
In conclusion, borrowing from the international business literature (Barlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989), this study finds administrative heritage an important construct to be 
studied in institutional change research. Administrative heritage reflects the unique 
characteristics of firms during institutional transition. It recognizes the continued 
effects of inherited firm-specific attributes from the previous institutional period 
relative to the new institutional period. As shown in the transitioning context of the 
Chinese economy, the non-separation between government administration and 
corporatization is an institutional barrier that appears to hinder corporate 
entrepreneurial growth.
Ownership heritage
My research findings indicated that ownership heritage imposed strong 
negative effects on member firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity. The 
government continues to have predominant influence as government retains 
significant ownership shares in group member firms. The transformation of the 
former state-owned enterprises into private firms refers simply to the transfer of 
operation rights, instead of the transfer of ownership and control, fi’om the state to the 
private entities. The continued government holding of ownership shares in firms may, 
again, reflect the lack of market-economy formal institutions, in a transition economy. 
The lack of well-developed stock market and property rights discourages private
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investors to invest in firms. Moreover, the continued government ownership in firms 
increases the likelihood o f expropriation of other owners, which further reduces the 
chances of private owners to invest.
In the privatization literature, Dharwadkar et al. (2000) treated government 
ownership as insider ownership of a firm. They argue that the long history of 
government involvement in the pre-privatized firms displays the dynamics of an 
insider in the privatized firms. And past studies support the contention that insider 
ownership can be effective in the context of strong governance. Comparing this 
finding, the negative effects of government ownership in this study may reflect the 
lack of a strong governance system due to the immature market development in the 
transition economies.
In all, the findings on administrative heritage and ownership heritage suggest 
that the pre-existing institutions in transition economy have important legacy effects 
on organizations. The existence o f these institutional legacy effects will slow down 
the pace of corporate entrepreneurial growth in firms. How long the institutional 
legacy effect will last is contingent on the pace of institutional transition and market 
development.
Reform policy
Consistent with the Hypothesis 4, a positive relationship between government 
reform policy and corporate entrepreneurial intensity is foimd. Reform policy is the 
vehicle for transforming the economy from a planned one to a market one. In fact, it 
is concluded that the most effective means to transform a planned country into a
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market economy is through regulations. In Scott’s (1995) terms, it is easier and 
quicker to pursue de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization through regulative 
means rather than through normative and cognitive means (Kostova, 1999). Changes 
in the regulative domain of the institutional environment will induce changes in the 
normative and cognitive domains. This study provides empirical evidence that the 
effects of the Economic Reform Policy are working in promoting more corporate 
entrepreneurial growth in China.
In summary, the empirical findings on government influence during 
institutional transition uncover the multi-dimensional structure of the government 
influence construct, which imposes different effects on corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity. This demonstrates exactly the crossroad effect of pre-existing and emerging 
formal institutions in a transition economy and highlights the importance of 
examining the evolutionary nature of such institutions in future studies.
Business Group’s Control Mechanisms
Cultural controls
The results o f this study strongly suggest that implementing cultural controls 
will facilitate more entrepreneurial activities in member firms o f a business group. 
This suggests that the cultural control mechanism substitutes for the market 
institutions by facilitating sharing resources and information for promoting 
innovation in products and processes. The interdependence of member firms firom 
different industrial sectors will fuel innovations with each other within the business 
groups, thereby, enhancing the total set of technological opportunities (Zahra et al..
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2002). In other words, cultural controls increase the ease and speed o f innovation 
diffusion among member firms. Second, cultural control mechanism is effective 
mechanism in governing member firms such that less opportunistic behaviors but 
more positive citizenship behaviors occur in a business group.
Past research, however, suggests that firms with strong cultural controls can 
become too homogeneous and less adaptive for innovations in the context o f Japan 
(Jaeger & Baliga, 1985). It is also found that business groups which are more 
centralized and with more hierarchical levels led to lower performance and 
productivity in their member firms in the context o f China (Keister, 1998). To check 
for possible curvilinear relationship between cultural controls and corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity, a square term of cultural controls is added in the same 
hierarchical regression model. The results showed that the square term of cultural 
controls, like its linear term, is positively and significantly related to corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity (0=0.10, p<0.001). This suggests that the stronger the 
cultural control, the much higher corporate entrepreneurial intensity of member firms 
is found in the Chinese business groups. This indicates that the institutional void and 
governance explanations are more suitable than the internal bureaucracy explanation 
in such a context and sample period. Future studies can further explore the curvilinear 
relationship between cultural controls and corporate entrepreneurial intensity.
Strategic controls
Compared to cultural controls and financial controls, the positive effect of 
strategic controls on corporate entrepreneurial intensity is apparently not as strong.
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One possible reason for this is that managers lack knowledge and skills to develop 
and implement competitive strategies as those developed in the market-based 
economy (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). An 
alternative reason is due to the administrative restructuring of member firms into a 
business group by local government as discussed earlier. The loose coordination 
among member firms due to those “forced marriages” makes strategic controls more 
difficult to implement.
Finally, the concept o f strategic controls may still be new to managers in the 
Chinese context. To those previous government officials, strategic may refer more to 
the national strategic mission instead of corporate strategic mission. Or as found in 
the Korean executives, strategic orientation may refer to the Korean cultural heritage 
that fosters a form of management Chandler called "group capitalism"(Barlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Hitt, Hardee, Tyler, & Park, 1995). This can be shown by the strong 
correlation between strategic controls and cultural controls in this study, indicating 
that the two constructs are closely related in the Chinese managers’ perception. 
Notwithstanding the weak empirical support, the results of this study did show that 
strategic benefits are realized with the use of strategic controls in monitoring member 
firms of Chinese business groups.
Financial controls
The results of this dissertation found strong support for the positive 
relationship between financial controls and corporate entrepreneurial intensity. This is 
in contrary to the negative effects o f financial controls on internal innovation in past
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empirical analysis using the US sample (Hitt, et al, 1996; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). 
This highlights the importance of financial economies provided by the use of 
financial control mechanism in a business group in transition economies. Financial 
controls, as an output control device, provide incentives for managers to utilize the 
abundant resources (from both the governments and business groups) more 
efficiently. In transition economies, enhancing efficiency requires firms to invest in 
better plant and equipment as well as process innovation due to undeveloped product 
and technological markets. Therefore, financial control motivates firms to pursue 
more corporate entrepreneurial growth in transition economies. In fact, financial 
controls may not necessarily lead to shortsightedness of managers because managers 
may have different interpretations of the financial indicators. For example, compared 
to U.S. executives, the Korean executives pursue financial indicators such as return 
on investment (ROI) for the purpose o f market expansion and growth (Hitt, Tyler, et 
al., 1995). They are less sensitive to short-term profitability and more sensitive to 
long-term growth strategies. Therefore, financial controls may motivate managers to 
focus more on long-term corporate entrepreneurial growth o f the firm.
An alternative explanation for this finding relates to the measures adopted in 
this study. The group control mechanisms constructs are measured as the managerial 
perception about the use o f control mechanisms imposed by their parent firms on the 
member firms in a business group. From these member firm managers’ perspective, it 
would be very risky for them to pursue expensive corporate entrepreneurial activities 
especially when the external capital market is still undeveloped. Instead, by relying 
on the internal capital market o f the business groups, member firms feel less risky to
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pursue corporate entrepreneurial activities because financial controls facilitated by the 
internal capital market helps pool the financial risks of member firms together. Also, 
with strong financial controls, managers may know the budget for these expenditures. 
Without strong financial controls, they may not know what is available to spend and 
thus be more conservative than they otherwise should be. Hence, financial controls 
exert positive influence on corporate entrepreneurial intensity.
In summary, informal institutions are said to fill the institutional voids during 
institutional transition (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). This study confirms this void-filling 
role of diversified business groups in the transitional economy o f China. The three 
group control mechanisms (cultural controls, strategic controls, and financial 
controls) help maximize the strategic and financial benefits of member firms by 
facilitating corporate entrepreneurial activities in the firms.
Complementarity bet>veen Formal Institutions and Informal Institutions
The results of this dissertation found that both formal institutions in the form 
of government influence and informal institutions in the form o f business group’s 
control mechanism have profound effects on corporate entrepreneurial intensity. 
However, formal and informal institutions are not working alone but they exist 
simultaneously (North, 1990). Furthermore, the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions is a self-enforcing constitution so that the formal institutions laid 
down by the government require a consensus among people to be willing to support 
and defend it (Weingast, 1993). That is, the constitutions that are constructed 
according to the principle o f the rule o f law need to be supported by the appropriate
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civic culture and shared beliefs. However, since the informal rules are anchored in 
people’s minds, changes in formal rules require social learning in order to produce the 
desired institutional results. This kind of social learning is a function of the expected 
pay-offs of different kinds of knowledge and the cognitive capacities required to 
solve the new kinds o f problems in the new institutional setting (North, 1995). As 
such, the kind of learning determines the direction o f institutional change and the rate 
of learning determines the speed o f institutional change. In sum, both formal and 
informal institutions have to be complementary with each other in order to achieve a 
successful institutional change. In support of a wealth-creating economy for the 
transition economies, the institutional framework requires the complementarity 
between formal and informal institutions. Therefore, I further examine the interaction 
effects between formal and informal institutions on corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity.
Formal and informal institutions may not transition at the same pace and in 
the same directions sometimes. In the transition economy o f China where a more 
gradual evolutionary institution transition is implemented, the old formal institutions 
have not been fully abolished while the emerging informal rules have been put into 
place. Thus, there is no complementarity between the old formal institutions carried 
over from the pre-reform era and the emerging informal institutions in the new reform 
era. Although conflicts may exist, the ultimate goal is to transition the economy 
towards a more clear institutional mix that is defined by new forms of formal and 
informal institutions.
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To necessitate the institutional change, a new set o f  informal rules is required 
to shape and cultivate new norms of social behaviors. The three types of control 
mechanisms -  cultural controls, strategic controls, and financial controls -  help 
revitalize the cognitive mindsets o f  managers in the firms that are constrained by the 
legacy of the previous communist government. Therefore, it is expected that the 
negative effects imposed by the inherited government influence (administrative 
heritage and ownership heritage) on corporate entrepreneurial intensity will be 
overcome by the new reforms as well as by the three types o f control mechanisms in 
the business groups. In other words, the three control mechanisms will moderate the 
relationship between the heritage variables and corporate entrepreneurial intensity 
such that the negative relationship is weaker for firms with a stronger emphasis on 
three types o f group controls.
Furthermore, the emergence of formal institutions in the form of government 
reform policy and informal institutions in the form o f diversified business groups are 
complementary with each other, thereby, fostering more entrepreneurial growth in the 
firms. For instance, the social sanction mechanism o f cultural controls fosters a new 
norm of behavior for member firms in a business group. These informal rules and 
codes of conduct are necessary for government reform policy to be effectively 
implemented.
Complementarity is also found in the use o f strategic controls and government 
reform policy. Strategic controls can help realize the strategic benefits o f member 
firms in a diversified business group. Firms under government influence via reform 
policy are shaped to follow the strategic directions set in the Economic Reform. In
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addition, as mentioned above, firms accumulate slack resources due to the 
preferential treatments of local governments during the Economic Reform. 
Implementing strategic controls can facilitate better utilization o f resources in 
strategically relevant ways and realize synergistic economies. As such, strategic 
controls coincide with the strategic orientations of firms under the reforming 
government influence so that more long-term strategic benefits will be realized.
Finally, the financial economies resulted from the use o f financial controls can 
help member firms that are now under harder budget constraints as opposed to the 
soft budget constraints for most state-owned enterprise in the pre-reform era. 
Therefore, financial controls, together with the incentives set by government reform 
policies, will better support firms to engage in corporate entrepreneurial activities. In 
all, it is expected that the three types of control mechanisms will reinforce the 
relationship between government influence via reform policy and corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity. That is, the three types o f controls will moderate the 
relationship between government reform policy and corporate entrepreneurial 
intensity such that the positive relationship is stronger for firms with a stronger 
emphasis on the three types of controls.
To test for the interaction effects, interaction terms are introduced to the 
model hierarchically. Models 4-6 include the interaction terms between 
administrative heritage and the three types of group’s control mechanism (cultural 
controls, strategic controls, and financial controls) variables. Models 7-9 include the 
interaction terms between ownership heritage and the three types o f group’s control 
variables. Models 10-12 include the interaction terms between government reform
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policy and the three types o f group control variables. To avoid multicollinearity 
problem in equations having interaction terms, centering procedure was taken (Cohen 
& Cohen, 1983). This also makes the effects of the interaction terms more 
interpretable. The results o f the post-hoc analysis on the interactive effects between 
government influence and business group’s control mechanisms on corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8.
Insert Tables 6, 7, and 8 About Here
In general, there are not strong interaction effects found. Among the total of 
12 pairs of interaction terms, four sets of interactions have statistical significant 
effects. Cultural control is found to have negative interactive effects with both firm 
founding ( R‘=0.003, B—0.05, p<0.05) and reform policy ( R“=0.01, B—0.06, 
p<0.05). Financial control is also found to have negative interactive effects with both 
firm founding ( R“=0.008, B—0.09, p<0.001) and government ownership
( R“=0.002, B—0.05, p<0.10). Strategic controls did not have any significant 
interaction effects with the government influence variables at all. The interaction 
plots of these four pairs o f interactions are presented in Figimes 5-8.
Insert Figure 5, 6, 7 and 8 About Here
These findings generally indicate the non-complementarity between formal 
and informal institutions during the institutional transition period in China. In 
particular, the negative effects o f  government influence outweigh the positive effects
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of group’s control mechanisms on corporate entrepreneurial intensity. This may be 
due to the fact that the formal institutions are so deeply rooted, while the new reform 
policy and emerging business group’s control mechanisms have a short history and 
will need to take extra time for them to be effective in overcoming the inertial effects 
o f the former institutional legacy.
In fact, the emergences o f formal and o f informal institutions are being 
implemented in different time frames. Usually, an institutional change is initiated by 
conscious changes in formal institutions, which subsequent requires complementary 
but more spontaneous changes in informal institutions in order for a complete 
institutional transition. Since the informal rules are anchored in people’s mindsets, it 
requires a learning process. This echoes North’s (1990) notion o f adaptive efficiency 
and the assessment o f which involves the consideration o f the willingness of a society 
to acquire knowledge and learning. In all, either formal and informal institutions 
alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition for wealth creation. The emphasis 
should be on the complementarity between the two. Accordingly, the interactions 
between formal and informal institutions deserve future research attention.
Future Research Agenda 
Institutions and Organizations
The dissertation has made contribution to organization and management 
theories on institutions and organizations. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the 
study is that it tapped the transition nature of institutions and examined such 
transitioning institutional effects on organizations. This supports the notion that the
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process of institutional transition is by nature an incremental one (Spicer, McDermott, 
& Kogut, 2000) and also underscores the importance of studying 
deinstitutionalization (Scott, 2001). This study adopts a cross-sectional approach to 
examine the snapshot of transitioning institutional effects on organization. However, 
it would be of great interests to study if  the effects o f transitioning institutions differ 
at different periods of institutional transition. For instance, will the negative effects o f 
government heritage and the positive effects of business group become weaker when 
the marketization of the economy is done? Longitudinal studies are called for further 
exploring the process of institutional transition. In all, this study highlights that 
institutional transition will be a fruitful area for us to further explore in the future.
In addition, this study has provided a finer-grained examination o f the 
institutional effects on firm’s strategy. This study has examined different types of 
institutional effects: formal and informal institutions, as well as pre-existing and 
emerging institutions. Also, the results o f this study suggest both positive and 
negative effects of government influence on corporate entrepreneurial intensity. 
Hence, this suggests that there may be heterogeneous effects of associated with one 
institutional factor. To extend from this study’s result, future research can examine if 
different levels o f governments have different impacts on firm’s strategies.
Finally, as shown in our post-hoc analysis, formal and informal institutions 
interact with each other. So, another potential topic in regard to institutions and 
organization is to examine the interactions between formal and informal institutions. 
For instance, one issue is about path dependencies. How will formal institutional 
change influence the type of social learning in order to facilitate corresponding
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informal institutional change? And how will the cognitive mindsets incorporate by 
informal institutions determine the direction and speed of institutional change in the 
future? Future studies can explore the issue of path dependencies in institutional 
change.
Business Groups
This dissertation also has made contribution to strategic management theories 
on business groups. The present study has provided a deeper understanding about the 
relationship between member firms and their parent firms in a business group. 
Previous research has focused on the rationales for the emergence o f business groups. 
However, research on how a diversified business group is managed is rare. This 
dissertation takes the first step to fill this gap by extending the concept of 
organizational controls in the multidivisional form literature to the business group 
level. It highlights the importance o f the adoption of appropriate control mechanism 
to realize the strategic benefits for the business groups. In particular, the findings 
show that both cultural controls and financial controls have strong positive effects on 
member firms’ corporate entrepreneurial intensity. This confirms again the 
institutional void-filling function of business groups that business groups substitute 
for markets in transition and emerging economies. Future studies may explore if there 
is a threshold beyond which the benefits realized by the control mechanisms will be 
outweighed by the costs of implementing them.
Also, the empirical findings of this study show that the three types o f control 
mechanisms (cultural, strategic, and financial) are correlated with each other. Future
I l l
studies focused on devising finer-grained measures to delineate the three related 
constructs would be helpful. Similarly, another measure that can be improved is 
geographic dispersion. Geographic dispersion is used as a control variable to control 
for the effects of coordination complexity resulted fi-om member firms being 
dispersed in different geographic locations. This study has adopted a count measure 
o f number o f geographic regions that the member firms o f the same business group 
are located. This measure has not taken the actual geographic distance into 
consideration, which may be a more appropriate measure in the context of emerging 
economies due to the underdeveloped communication and transportation 
infrastructure. Future studies may consider using a geographic distance measure.
This dissertation also gives an alternative answer on the mixed findings of 
group effect on firm performance in the past literature. Past literature suggest that 
empirical evidence about the favorable effects of business groups on economic 
development via their effects on the firm performance of member firms remains 
speculative (Aoki, 1982; Caves & Uekusa, 1976; Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b; Leff, 1978; Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian, 1996; Stark, 1996). This 
study examines the contribution of business groups to economic development via 
their effects on member firm’s corporate entrepreneurial intensity. Corporate 
entrepreneurial intensity represents the wealth-creating internal capabilities of a firm, 
and therefore, should have more direct impact on economic development. The 
empirical findings o f this study suggest that the group effect on member firm 
performance is contingent on institutional transition. The positive effects o f business 
group control mechanisms on corporate entrepreneurial intensity are weakened by the
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institutional legacy effects such as government administrative heritage and ownership 
heritage. This indicates that the group effects on member firms may be contingent on 
the pace of deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization. Future longitudinal 
studies may explore the effect o f institutional change on the relationship between 
group membership and firm performance.
Corporate Entrepreneurship
This dissertation has made contribution to corporate entrepreneurship theories 
on wealth creation. The present study responds to the recent call for the integration 
between strategic management and corporate entrepreneurship, or strategic 
entrepreneurship, for wealth creation (Hamel, 2000; Hitt, et al., 2001). Strategic 
entrepreneurship is entrepreneurial action with a strategic perspective (Hitt, et al.,
2001). This study goes beyond the focus on the emergence o f business groups 
(entrepreneurship) in transition economies, and examines how advantage is 
established and maintained from what is created in a business group (strategic 
management).
Also, both entrepreneurial and strategic perspectives should be integrated to 
examine entrepreneurial strategies that create wealth. Entrepreneurship is particularly 
important in transition economies because enhanced entrepreneurship in a country 
leads to greater national prosperity and competitiveness (Zahra, 1999). This study 
shows that business group is the engine for entrepreneurial growth in transition 
economies. Strategic management is also important for wealth creation in transition 
economies. This study demonstrates the commitment, decisions, and actions induced
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by the Chinese government to help firms become more competitive in the market. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that wealth creation via corporate 
entrepreneurial growth in transition economies is induced by government and 
facilitated by the large business groups.
In all, this study has paved a research path for integrating strategic 
management and corporate entrepreneurship in studying the wealth creation by 
business groups in transition economies. This study has examined the longer-term 
corporate entrepreneurial strategies and focused more on product innovations. Future 
studies may examine other corporate entrepreneurial strategies such as new venture 
creations and corporate renewals.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this dissertation has added to strategic management and 
organization theory literatures focused on institutions and corporate entrepreneurship. 
During institutional transition, a transition economy is facing institutional voids. Both 
government and business groups play critical roles in filling these institutional voids. 
On the one hand, formal institutions are transitioning. Government intends to foster 
economic growth by carrying out economic reform to facilitate more corporate 
entrepreneurial activities. However, such growth is impeded by the institutional 
legacy such as administrative heritage and ownership heritage of the government. On 
the other hand, business groups, as an informal institution, are emerging during the 
institutional transition. The cultural control, strategic control, and financial control 
mechanisms implemented in the business groups help facilitate member firms’
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resource allocation and knowledge diffusion for corporate entrepreneurial growth. 
Taken together, both of the transitioning formal institutions via government influence 
and informal institutions via business group’s control mechanisms are important for 
the wealth-creating corporate entrepreneurial growth in transition economies.
This study sheds light on institutional theory literature by simultaneously 
examining the effects of formal and informal institutions during the period of 
institutional transition. It also contributes to the strategic management literature by 
looking at the relationship between government and firm strategy. Also, it examines 
the management and governance of business groups, which has little research 
attention in the literature so far. Finally, this dissertation has paved a research path for 
the importance of integrating strategic management and corporate entrepreneurship in 
studying the wealth creation by government and business groups in transition 
economies. In all, the results of this dissertation have critical implications on the 
relationship between institutional changes and strategy for firms and policy makers.
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Table 1
A Review of Current Literature on Business Groups
The Structural View The Functional View Performance Implications
1. Organizational Ties
Member firms are tied by vertical or horizontal links along 
the value chain.
• Vertical-. Vertical keiretsus
• Horizontal-. Japanese keiretsus, Taiwan’s guanxi 
giye
1. Economic function
Diversified business groups perform an important 
role as market intermediaries for member firms to 
economize on the transaction costs. (Caves, 1989; 
Goto, 1982; Khanna and Palepu 2000b; Leff, 1978; 
Spulber, 1995)
1. Positive performance findings:
• Korean chaebols (Chang & Choi 
(1988)
• Chinese business groups (Keister, 
1998)
2. Economic Ties
Member firms are tied by ownership links,
• Family: Korean chaebols
• Holding company: Mexican groupos
• Banks: Japanese keiretsus
• Pyramidal ownership: Italy, India, and Indonesia
2. Social function
Business groups are formed for such goals as 
legitimacy, prestige and power, and social solidarity. 
(Granovetter, 1995)
2. Negative performance findings:
• Japanese keiretsus (Caves & Uekusa, 
1976; Nakatani, 1984; Weistein & 
Yafeh, 1999)
• Multi-country sample (Khanna & 
Yafeh. 1999)
3. Social Ties
Member firms are tied by social or relational links.
• Director interlocks: Japanese keiretsus, Chinese 
business groups
• Family ties: Korean chaebols
• Kinship ties: Indian business groups
• School ties: Chinese and Korean business groups
3. Political function
Business groups have an important role in fostering 
macroeconomic development. Some are founded or 
directed by the government, e.g. business groups in 
China, Korea, Indonesia, Latin American, and 
Pakistan. (Leff, 1978; Keister, 1998; Schwartz, 1992; 
Stark, 1996; White, 1974)
3. Mixed performance findings:
I. IVeak member firms benefit while 
strong member firms do not
• Japanese keiretsus (Lincoln et al., 
1996)
•  Korean chaebols (Chang and Hong, 
2000)
Z Performance contingent on the ievel 
of group’s diversification
• Chilean and Indian business groups 
Khanna & Palepu (2000a, 2000b)
3. Performance depends on country 
differences
•  14-countries sample (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001)
4. Institutional Ties
Business groups are closely linked with external 
institutions.
• Banks and financial institutions: Japanese 
keiretsus and Taiwan’s guanxi giye
• Government: Korean chaebols, Taiwan’s guanxi 
qiye, Chinese business groups, Indonesian 
business groups
4. Organizational function 
Diversified business group as a multidivisional fomi 
structure that performs the function of cross­
subsidization among member firms.
(Chandler, 1982; Chang & Hong, 2000; Encaoua & 
Jacquemin, 1982)
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TABLE 2 
Description of Measures
Constructs Measures
Data
Source
Cronbach’s Median 
Alpha rwG
Dependent variable
Corporate
entrepreneurial
intensity
7-point scale (1-Decreased to 7-Increased):
In the last 3 years, estimate the average change in each of the following 
items:
(1) Research and development expenditure
(2) Number of new product introduced to markets
(3) Plant and equipment investment
(4) Marketing and distribution expenditure
Survey 0.81
Independent variables
Administrative heritage (1) Firm founding: A dummy variable with 1 indicates that 
government has influence on the founding of member firms, and 0 
indicates otherwise.
(2) CEO and board selection: 7-point scale (1-Little extent to 7-Large 
extent)
Please indicate the extent to which government has influence on the 
following items:
i. nomination of CEO
ii. selection of members of the firm's board
Survey
Survey 0.68*
Since only two items are included in this scale, an inter-item correlation coefficient is computed instead of the Cronbach's alpha. U)U)
Constructs Measures
Data
Source
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Median
r \V G
Ownership heritage
Government influence 
via reform policy
Cultural controls
Government ownership: % of shares owned by government in business Archival
groups
7-point scale ( 1 -Little extent to 7-Large extent): Perceptual
Please indicate the extent to your Arm is influenced by the following 
government (both central and local) policies:
( 1 ) Industrial development policy
(2) Favorable taxation to a firm entering into a specific industrial 
sector
(3) Using the size of a group’s sales as an indicator of economic 
growth
(4) Economic growlh strategy
7-point self-developed scale ( 1 -Little extent to 7-Large extent): Perceptual
Please evaluate the following items as to the extent they influence the 
member firm manager’s performance:
(1) Firm’s reputation within the group.
(2) Comply with a strong group culture.
(3) Maintain trusting relationship within the group.
(4) Maintain cordial relationships with each other in the group.
(5) Participate in social activities with other member firm managers
(6) Support other member firms in the group, even to sacrifice one 
member firm’s benefit to support other member firms to achieve 
goals.
0.88
0.83 0.74
U)4^
Constructs Measures
Data Cronbach’s Median
Source Alpha rwo
Strategic controls 7-point scale (1-Little extent to 7-Large extent) adopted from Hill, Hitt, 
and Hoskisson (1992);
Please indicate the extent to which the group’s executives understand 
and shape the effectiveness of the strategy formulated by member firm 
managers by evaluating the following statements:
(1) The parent understands the industry in which the member firm 
competes
(2) The parent understands the strategy of the member firm
(3) The parent understands the strategy of the principal competitors 
of the member firm
(4) The parent jointly develops strategic initiatives with the member 
firm
Perceptual 0.88 0.77
Financial controls 7-point scale (1-Little extent to 7-Large extent) adopted from Hill, Hitt, 
and Hoskisson (1992):
Please indicate the extent to which the group executives use the 
following criteria to evaluate your managers’ performance:
(1) Return on assets (ROA)
(2) Profit
(3) Sales
(4) Sales growth
Perceptual 0.83 0.86
w
Constructs Measures
Data
Source
Cronbach’s Median 
Alpha fwG
Control variables
Firm level:
Firm size Log of average number of employees from 1996 to 1998 Archival
Firm performance 
relative to principal 
competitors
Combined average of three performance indicators:
7-point scale (1-Decreased to 7-Increased)
In the last 3 years, estimate the average change in each of the following 
items:
(1) Return on assets relative to principal competitors
(2) Return on equity relative to principal competitors
(3) Return on sales relative to principal competitors
Perceptual 0.97
Current ratio Average of total assets divided by total liabilities from year 1996 to 
1998
Archival
Business group level:
Group’s product 
diversification
4-digit entropy measure (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 
1985):
Entropy measure = IPj x In(l/Pj)
Archival
Group’s geographic 
dispersion
Number of geographical regions member firms are located divided by 
number of member firms in the business group
Archival
Group performance Changes in return on sales in the last three years Perceptual
U )On
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TABLE 3
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Dependent and Independent Variables
Constructs Variables
Factor
loadings
(standar­
dized)
Composite
reliability
Average
variance
extracted
Corporate R&D expenditure 0.85 0.82 0.54
entrepreneurial No. of new products 0.58
intensity Plant & equip, investment 0.68
Marketing & dist. exp. 0.80
Administrative Founding dummy 1.00
heritage
CEO selection 0.84 0.68 0.53
Board member selection 0.60
Government State ownership 1.00
heritage
Government reform Industrial policy 0.84 0.88 0.66
policy Taxation policy 0.83
Sales growth policy 0.75
Economic strategy policy 0.82
Cultural controls Reputation 0.52 0.83 0.47
Comply to culture 0.65
Trusting relationships 0.86
Cordial relationships 0.82
Social activities 0.68
Support each other 0.48
Strategic controls Understand firm’s industry 0.85 0.89 0.66
Understand firm’s strategy 0.88
Understand competitors’ 0.81
strategy
Develop strategic initiatives 0.70
Financial controls Return on assets 0.51 0.83 0.56
Profit 0.59
Sales 0.88
Sales growth 0.94
Model fit Chi square 1306.3 (df=273, p<0.001)
GFl 0.91
CFI 0.91
RMSEA 0.06
Standardized RMSR 0.04
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 VIE
1. Entrepreneurial
growth
intensity
4.99 1.34 1.00
2. Firm  founding 0.36 0.48 -.07* 1.00 1.09
3. CEO/board
selection
1.36 0.72 -.03 .20** 1.00 1.10
4. State
ownership
0.77 0.28 -.09** .15** .03 1.00 1.12
5. Reform  policy 3.23 1.91 .08** .12** .17** .02 1.00 1.06
6. Cultural
controls
5.04 1.34 .19** -.04 -.06* -.07* .04 1.00 1.06
7. Strategic
controls
5.30 1.45 .12** -.03 -.02 -.01 .05 .46** 1.00 1.03
8. Financial
controls
5.84 1.27 .21** -.01 -.04 -.04 .13** .39** .33** 1.00 1.06
9. Log o f  
em ployees
6.30 1.95 .10** .13** .16** .14** .12** -.06* .02 .04 1.00 1.10
10. Current ratio 2.98 19.60 -.01 -.03 .02 .00 -.04 .04 .02 -.12** -.08** 1.00 1.05
11. Relative
perform ance
4.53 1.59 .49** -.07* -.04 -.08** .05 .20** .13** .12** -.08** .06* 1.00 1.01
12. Group’s
product
diversification
0.83 0.51 .04 -.01 -.06* -.20** .05* -.04 -.04 .05 .10** -.02 .01 1.00 1.07
13. G roup’s
geographic
dispersion
0.11 0.26 .02 .04 -.05 .14** -.03 -.08** -.04 -.03 .08** -.01 .01 -.01 1.00 1.04
14. G roup’s ROA 4.64 1.67 .11** -.09** -.09** -.12** .02 .12** .10** .09** -.13** .04 .18** .02 -.08** 1.00 1.07
"‘Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
"‘^ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
N=992
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TA BLES 
Results of the Hierarchical Regressions
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D ependent Variable:
C orporate entrepreneurial
intensity
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5
C ontrols variables: Base
m odel
Log o f  total number o f .14*** .15*** .16*** .15*** .15***em ployees
ROI, ROS, ROA relative to .50*** .49*** .47*** .48*** .47***
competitors
Current ratio -.0 3 - .02 -.0 3 -.0 3 - .01
Group product diversification .03 .01 .01 .01 .00
Group geographic dispersion .01 .02 .03 .02 .02
Group ROA .04 .03 .02 .02 .02
Independent variables:
Government influence
Firm founding - .0 5 t - .0 5 f - .0 5 t -.0 5
CEO and board selection - .03 - .0 2 - .0 2 - 0 2 f
Ownership - .07* - .06* - .07* - .06*
Policy ,0 2 t .04 .05f .03
Group's control mechanisms
Cultural controls .10***
Strategic controls .05 t
Financial controls .14***
Model R^ .263 .273 .283 .276 .291
Adjusted R^ .259 .266 .275 .267 .283
Change in R^ .263 .010 .010 .003 .018
Model F Statistic 58.780*** 6.866*** 5.203*** 3.917*** 36.545***
F-Statistic for Change 58.780*** 3.243*** 13.63*** 3.352t 24.364***
N =992. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, f  p<.10. 
P estim ates are standardized.
TABLE 6
Results of the H ierarchical Regressions
In teraction  Effects: C ultu ral Controls
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D ependent Variable;
C orporate entrepreneurial
intensity
Model 3 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Base Founding CEO/board Ownership Policy
Model
C ontrols variables:
Log o f  total number o f .16*** .16*** .16*** .16*** .16***
em ployees
ROI, ROS, ROA relative to Al*** .47*** .47*** .47*** .47***
competitors
Current ratio - .0 3 -.0 3 - .03 - .03 -.0 3
Group product diversification .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
Group geographic dispersion .03 .02 .03 .03 .03
Group ROA .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Independent variables:
Government influence
Firm founding - .0 5 t -.0 8 ? -.0 5 ? -.0 5 ? -.0 5 ?
CEO and board selection - .02 -.0 5 -.0 3 - .02 - .02
Ownership - .06* -.1 4 * -.0 6 * - .06* - .07*
Policy .04 .02 .05? .05? .05*
Group’s control mechanisms
Cultural controls JO*** .11*** .10*** .10*** .10***
Strategic controls
Financial controls
Interaction  Term s:
Founding x Cultural Controls -.0 5 *
CEO/board x Cultural Controls - .04
Ownership x Cultural Controls -.009
Policy X Cultural Controls -.06*
Model R^ .283 .286 .285 .283 .283
Adjusted R^ 215 .277 .276 .274 .275
Change in R* .010 .003 .002 .000 .010
Model F Statistic 35.203*** 32.699*** 32.487*** 32.249*** 35.203***
F-Statistic for Change 13.63*** 3.980* 2.158 .106*** 13.63***
N=992. *** p<.001, ♦♦ p<.01, * p<.05, f p<.IO.
P estimates are standardized.
T A B L E ?
Results o f the H ierarchical Regressions
In teraction  Effects: Strategic C ontrols
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Dependent Variable:
C orporate entrepreneurial
intensity
M odel 4 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Base Founding CEO/board Ownership Policy
Model
C ontrols variables:
Log o f  total number o f .15*** .15*** .15*** .15***
em ployees
ROI, ROS, ROA relative to .48**’» .48*** .48*** .48*** .48***
competitors
Current ratio - .0 3 -.0 3 - .03 - .03 - .03
Group product diversification .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
Group geographic dispersion .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Group ROA .02 .03 .02 .02 .02
Independent variables:
Government influence
Firm founding - .0 5 t - .0 5 t - .0 5 f - .0 5 t - .0 5 f
CEO and board selection - .02 - .0 2 - .0 2 - .0 3 -.0 3
Ownership -.0 7 * - .07* -.0 7 * - .0 7 * - .07*
Policy .05 t .05t .051 .05 f .05t
Group’s control mechanisms
Cultural controls
Strategic controls .051 .05t .05 t .051 .05t
Financial controls
Interaction Terms:
Founding x Strategic Controls .001
CEO/board x Strategic Controls .012
Ownership x Strategic Controls - .0 4
Policy X Strategic Controls - .0 2
Model R^ .276 .276 .276 .277 .276
Adjusted R* .267 .267 .267 .268 .267
Change in R‘ .003 .000 .000 .001 .003
Model F Statistic 33.917*** 31.059*** 31.081*** 31.265*** 33.917***
F-Statistic for Change 3 .352t .001 0.189 3 .3 5 2 t 3 .352t
N=992. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, f  p<.10.
P estimates are standardized.
TA BLE 8
Results of the H ierarchical Regressions
Interaction  Effects: F inancial C ontrols
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D ependent V ariable: 
C orporate entrepreneurial 
intensity
C ontrols variables:
Model 5 
Base 
Model
Model 14 
Founding
Model 15 Model 16 
CEO/board Ownership
Model 17 
Policy
Log o f  total number o f  
em ployees
ROI, ROS, ROA relative to
competitors
Current ratio
Group product diversification  
Group geographic dispersion 
Group ROA
1 5 * * *
Al***
- .0 1
.00
.02
.02
.15***
.47***
- .00 
.00 
.02 
.02
.15***
.47***
- .01 
.00 
.02 
.02
.15***
.47***
-.01
.00
.02
.02
.15***
.47***
- .01 
.00 
.02 
.02
Independent variables:
Government influence
Firm founding
CEO and board selection
Ownership
Policy
- .0 5 f  
- .02 
- .06* 
.03
- ,05t
- .02
- .06* 
.03
- .0 5 f
- .0 2
- .0 6 *
.03
- .0 5 t  
- .02 
- .06* 
.03
- .0 5 f  
- .02 
- .06* 
.03
Group’s control mechanisms 
Cultural controls 
Strategic controls 
Financial controls 14*** .14*** .14*** .14*** .14***
Interaction  Term s:
Founding x Financial Controls 
CEO/board x Financial Controls 
Ownership x Financial Controls 
Policy X Financial Controls
- .09***
-.0 1
- .0 5 t
- .0 0
Model R^
Adjusted R^
Change in R“
Model F Statistic 
F-Statistic for Change
.291
.283
.018
36.545***
24.364***
.299
.290
.008
34.775***
11.149***
.291
.282
.000
36.545***
.238
.293
.284
.002
33.777***
2.648t
.291
.283
.000
36.545***
24.364***
N=992. p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, f  p<.10.
P estimates are standardized.
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FIGURE 6
Interaction plot: reform policy and cuitural controls
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FIGURE 7
Interaction plot: firm founding and financial controls
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FIGURE 8
Interaction plot: state ownership and financial controls
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